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ABSTRACT
This Article develops the argument that the Federal Constitution
of 1787 was conceptualized, drafted, and put into operation not only
for American citizens but also for foreign audiences. In a world
without supranational governing institutions, a constitution—at
least, the Federal Constitution—might serve to promote peaceable
international relations based on reciprocal trade and open credit.
That at least was the Enlightenment-inflected hope.
 Did it work? If early Americans engaged in constitution-making
in large part to demonstrate their capacity for self-government, self-
discipline, and commercial openness to foreign audiences, did anyone
notice? Or was it all, regardless of diplomatic purposes and consis-
tent with the conventional account of the American Founding, just an
intramural affair? This Article argues that many foreigners did
notice, not least because some of them had participated in the process
of reform. Although no foreigners intervened directly in drafting or
ratification, international demands, incentives, and reactions shaped
the way that leading American Framers pursued constitution-
making. After a “foreign ratification debate” that stretched into the
first years of the Washington Administration, Britain normalized
diplomatic relations with the United States and substantial capital
investment followed. In 1791, the British Board of Trade approvingly
analyzed the Constitution in a report designed to guide the Privy
Council as it drafted instructions for its first official envoy to the
United States. Within fifteen years, Britons were the largest holders
of foreign investment in the United States, including state and
federal “domestic debt,” or the restructured wartime certificates and
loans that had floated the Revolution. In sum, Britons ultimately
financed much of the project of American independence, and
contemporaries believed that these credit relations would reduce,
without eliminating, the prospect of renewed war.
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INTRODUCTION: THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE ATLANTIC
WORLD
In a series of recent articles, David Golove and I have argued that
American constitution-making began as an international process:
the revolutionary generation conceptualized, drafted, and institu-
tionalized their new constitutions not only for domestic constituen-
cies but also for foreign audiences.1 To appeal to those audiences,
and to persuade them to trade and invest in post-revolutionary
America, the Framers incorporated several guarantees of interna-
tional commitments under treaties and the law of nations into the
Federal Constitution.2 Many Founders conceived of the Federal Con-
stitution in particular as a promise to foreign nations, conveyed in
a legible script for action, that the United States would fulfill its
international obligations as a member of what they saw as “the
civilized world.”3 The so-called “critical period,” a diagnosis to which
foreign critics contributed, demonstrated to many Americans the
necessity of structural reform to give the federal government not
only the powers to tax and spend, but also to regulate international
commerce, manage foreign policy, and enforce obligations under
treaties and the law of nations.4 The resulting Constitution
1. See, e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010) [hereinafter Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation]; David M.
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “The Known Opinion of the Impartial World”: Foreign Rela-
tions and the Law of Nations in The Federalist, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE
FEDERALIST (Jack N. Rakove & Colleen Sheehan eds.) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Golove &
Hulsebosch, Known Opinion]; see also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio:
Constitution-Making and the Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
759 (2014) [hereinafter Hulsebosch, Revolutionary Portfolio]; Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete
and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial
Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825 (2006) [hereinafter Hulsebosch, Discrete and Cosmopolitan].
Throughout, the term “constitution-making” is preferred to the conventional “Founding” to
mitigate the exceptionalism frequently associated with the latter term.
2. Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 991-94.
3. See id. at 938.
4. See id. at 947-48, 991-94. For work on federal constitution-making that concentrates
on the powers to tax and spend, see generally ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC:
FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1993); MAX M. EDLING, A
REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING
OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003); and E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790 (1961).
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centralized the foreign affairs powers up from the states and then
distributed those powers across the federal government to foster
expertise and to insulate some aspects of foreign relations from the
relatively democratic House of Representatives.5 In addition, and
most relevant to this Article, it entrenched within the American
constitutional order institutional commitments to fulfill interna-
tional obligations, particularly public and private financial obliga-
tions. Under the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, existing as well as
future treaties became the law of the land, enforceable in state and
federal courts.6 That Article also recognized the validity of all debts
“entered into, before the [a]doption of th[e] Constitution.”7 These
two guarantees in Article VI were the Constitution’s only retroactive
provisions. In addition, state governments were forbidden to issue
paper money, impair the obligations of contracts, and conduct war
or diplomacy with foreign nations, including Native American na-
tions within the nation’s borders.8 Finally, a powerful and independ-
ent Executive would play a leading role in developing foreign policy
and enforcing it within the states.9
Did it work? If federal constitution makers sought to demonstrate
their capacity for self-government to foreign audiences, did anyone
notice? If they noticed, what exactly did they notice? Or was it all,
regardless of diplomatic purposes and consistent with the conven-
tional account of the Founding, just an intramural affair?
This Article argues that federal constitution-making did play an
important role in persuading Europeans to recognize the United
States along a number of dimensions. Before and after the Philadel-
phia Convention, European diplomats, Enlightenment thinkers,
displaced British loyalists, transatlantic merchants, and overseas
investors paid close attention to constitutional developments in the
United States. Together they formed important foreign audiences
for American political development in the generation after the
5. Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, 996-98.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). To enforce this
provision, Article III provided federal court jurisdiction over existing and future treaties. Id.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under “Treaties made,
or which shall be made” under the authority of the Constitution or laws of the United States).
7. Id. art. VI, cl. 1.
8. Id. art. I, § 10.
9. Id. art. II, §§ 2-3.
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Revolution. Even the term “audience,” suggesting passive observa-
tion, is too weak. Instead, foreign actors participated in a number
of ways. Although foreigners did not intervene directly in the Con-
stitution’s drafting or formal ratification, international demands,
incentives, and reactions shaped the way that Americans undertook
constitution-making in the 1780s and beyond.
Ultimately, the influence flowed both ways across the Atlantic.
Foreign demands clarified American perceptions of what they
wished to achieve by constitutional government. In turn Americans
helped redesign the legal infrastructure of the international system
they sought to enter, particularly respecting the protection of
foreign capital, setting precedents defining liberal governance that
remain powerful today as neoliberal ideals. Those notions of good
governance have, however, been abstracted from their specific, and
forgotten, origins. After the Revolution, Americans and their foreign
audiences began to map out what it meant for a postcolonial polity
to enter the European community of “civilized nations,” not just
formally with treaties of peace and commerce, but also as a full
participant in the Atlantic economy of trade and finance. Converting
imperial connections into international relations, the Framers
sought to create not a fiscal-military state of the sort familiar to
European experience but instead a fiscal-commercial state approxi-
mating Enlightenment ideals.10 There was no conventional blue-
print.11 There were instead legacy relations of the British Empire
mixed with new ideas about how the United States could profit from
European connections without being drawn into Europe’s wars, a
10. See EDLING, supra note 4, at 47-51, 219-29. Max Edling’s discussion is modeled on
John Brewer’s analysis of eighteenth-century Britain. See JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF
POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688-1783 (1988). See generally THE MILITARY
REVOLUTION AND THE STATE, 1500-1800 (Michael Duffy ed., 1980). For skepticism about
whether the eighteenth-century British state is best characterized as a fiscal-military state,
see Steve Pincus & James Robertson, Challenging the Fiscal-Military Hegemony: The British
Case, in THE BRITISH FISCAL-MILITARY STATES, 1660-C.1783, at 229, 229-62 (Aaron Graham
& Patrick Walsh eds., 2016).
11. The gradual independence in the Netherlands from the sixteenth to the seventeenth
century is distinguishable on the long-term scale (recovery of formal local political control
rather than initial independence), location, and especially relative economic development: by
1600, the Netherlands was already the premier carrying power in Europe and a net inter-
national creditor. See generally JAMES C. RILEY, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND
THE AMSTERDAM CAPITAL MARKET, 1740-1815 (1980); Richard Sylla, Book Review, 51 ECON.
HIST. REV. 625, 625-26 (1998).
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combination that also appealed to some in France and Britain as a
political ideal and a strategic convenience.12
The document carried some of the burden of proof but did not
suffice. Single-text constitutions were portable and legible but not
comprehensive.13 Given the Federal Constitution’s ambiguities and
gaps, construction mattered. By the early 1790s, after a period of
inquiry and assessment that can be called the foreign ratification
debate, influential European audiences became persuaded that the
new federal government was capable of adhering to the law of na-
tions, conducting diplomacy, and regulating commerce.14 The con-
nection between constitution-making and commercial integration
was not simply sequential. Foreign governments and their subjects
causally linked their behavior to the Constitution and the federal
institutions built on it. Proof was diplomatic normalization, partic-
ularly with Britain, and an unprecedented amount of capital in-
vestment, first from Dutch investors and eventually also from the
12. The classic study of early American commitment to commercial integration and
political neutrality toward Europe is FELIX GILBERT, TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF
EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1961). 
13. “[M]uch of early modern European statecraft,” James C. Scott argues, “seemed ...
devoted to rationalizing and standardizing what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and
administratively more convenient format.” JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW
CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 3 (1998). It was how
states made internal sense of their land, people, and resources. See id. at 2-3. This Article
borrows the suggestive notion of legibility and explores the degree to which it applies
historically to the communication of information internationally between states through
constitution-making.
14. See infra Part III. The terms “nation” and “state” had multiple meanings during the
eighteenth century. Here they carry the connotation current in the early modern literature
and practice of the law of nations: a nation or state (the terms were convertible) was an
independent, self-governing polity entitled to the rights and subject to the duties of the law
of nations. “Nations or states,” wrote Emer de Vattel in the first section of his treatise on the
law of nations, first published in 1758, “are bodies politic, societies of men united together to
procure their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union.” 1 EMER DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 1 (1760). Such a state was a “moral person [possessing]
an understanding and a will peculiar to itself, and is susceptible of obligations and laws.” Id.
“The law of nations is the science of the law subsisting between nations or states, and of the
obligations that flow from it.” Id. This external connotation of nation originally revealed little
about the internal constitution of a polity, which might be a kingdom, republic, or empire. Cf.
JANE BURBANK & FREDERICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY: POWER AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE (2010) (observing the predominance of empires, not nation-states, throughout
most history).
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British.15 Diplomatic and commercial normalization with Britain
had cascading effects on other relationships. It quickly brought
nominal friends, like the Spanish,16 and ongoing enemies, like many
of the Northwest Native American nations, to the negotiating
table.17 Paradoxically, the recognition process with France, the
United States’ first military ally, passed through a long period in
which the royal and then revolutionary governments treated the
United States as a quasi-state, a phase that ended with the termi-
nation of the alliance during the Quasi-War.18
This Article, however, focuses on the relationship that was most
critical to the commercial development of the early United States:
the Anglo-American connection. It begins in Part I by providing a
brief account of the Federalist vision of international relations and
identifies debt as a common denominator among the foreign au-
diences. Part II traces the British critique of American government
during the 1780s, as well as the partial incorporation of that foreign
perspective among constitutional reformers. Part III analyzes the
British assessment of the Federal Constitution and the government
built on it. Part IV begins to sketch out connections between the
British assessment and financial integration of the United States
into European markets, connections that will be mapped more pre-
cisely in future work.
15. See MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES TO
1914, at 34-39 (1989).
16. The Spanish ceased plans to colonize the American Southwest and began to permit
American navigation on the Mississippi River. See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, PINCKNEY’S TREATY:
A STUDY OF AMERICA’S ADVANTAGE FROM EUROPE’S DISTRESS, 1783-1800, at 265-67 (1926);
JAMES E. LEWIS, JR., THE AMERICAN UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF NEIGHBORHOOD: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE, 1783-1829, at 21-23 (1998).
17. The Northwest Native American Nations ceased fighting along the Ohio River,
thereby opening swaths of the Northwest Territory for white settlement and intra-American
state-building. See ERIC HINDERAKER, ELUSIVE EMPIRES: CONSTRUCTING COLONIALISM IN THE
OHIO VALLEY, 1673-1800, at 244-45 (1997); RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS,
EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815, at 472-75 (1991).
18. See, e.g., HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION (1973).
2018] BEING SEEN LIKE A STATE 1247
I. CREDIT AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
CONSTITUTION-MAKING
A. The Enlightenment and Constitutional Reform
Integrating the United States into the Atlantic world of commerce
and culture had been a central, and in the 1780s, still unfulfilled,
goal of the Revolution. Nations, like individuals, were presumed to
be sociable and had the duty as well as right to work together with
others. To that end, American constitution makers sought to con-
struct a government that, consistent with a dominant strand of the
Enlightenment, would encourage sociability—particularly, com-
merce—within and beyond national borders. The way to do so, they
believed, was to modulate impassioned, localist, and short-term
politics, while promoting decision-making along a broader temporal
and spatial horizon.19
Although the nature of the connections between nations, and even
the definition of which polities counted as “nations,” was contested,
few Americans doubted that there was in fact an international
community of states that should, at least, govern their relations by
common legal principles in war and peace.20 Commercial sociability
was hardly the same as perpetual harmony.21 Commercial competi-
tion could be fraught and even incite war.22 Yet competition was not
itself war. Nor did it have to lead to war, if nations committed them-
selves institutionally, Federalists argued, to upholding treaties and
the customary law of nations at home.23 A fundamental premise of
Enlightenment theory about international relations was that in-
creased interaction between people from different nations would
generate extra-national connections and interdependence that
19. Hulsebosch, Revolutionary Portfolio, supra note 1, at 763. In a typical formulation,
James Wilson wrote: “‘The general principle,’ says Burlamaqui, ‘of the law of nations, is noth-
ing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges nations to the same duties as are
prescribed to individuals.’” 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nations, in THE WORKS OF THE
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 145, 155 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804).
20. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 940-41.
21. See id. at 976.
22. See id. at 976 & n.178.
23. See id. at 980-81.
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would discourage rash destruction of those ties in war.24 That was
the premise beneath the skein of commercial treaties immortalized
in theory by the Treaties of Utrecht.25 Everyone knew that these
treaties had failed to preserve peace.26 International agreements
with only the sanctions of “good faith” were incapable of laying the
groundwork of peaceful international relations.27 What was needed
instead, American constitutional reformers argued, was to build
those commitments into national constitutions.28 In the absence of
an international coercive governance regime, municipal govern-
ments would have to discipline themselves.29 Many members of the
founding generation subscribed to these notions and did not view
international obligations as trespasses upon sovereignty.30 A power-
ful structure for conducting foreign affairs, adhering to treaties, and
facilitating foreign commerce would integrate the Union into the
Atlantic world of commerce. In sum, the Constitution was supposed
to reconcile the twin goals of the Revolution that had been an-
nounced in the Declaration of Independence: popular sovereignty
and international recognition.31
The desire to modulate democratic influence on the management
of foreign affairs did not extend to the power to declare war.32
Developing the Enlightenment ideal of perpetual peace glossed
most recently by Adam Smith, the founding generation believed
24. See GILBERT, supra note 12, at 44-48; see also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS
AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 100-13
(1977).
25. See Doohwan Ahn, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1713: Tory Trade Politics
and the Question of Dutch Decline, 36 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 167 (2010), and Antonella Alimento,
Commercial Treaties and the Harmonisation of National Interests: The Anglo-French Case
(1667-1713), in WAR, TRADE AND NEUTRALITY: EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 107 (Antonella Alimento ed., 2011), for
discussions of the Treaty of Utrecht.
26. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
27. Id.
28. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 989-90.
29. For elaboration, see id.
30. See id. at 994.
31. On the Declaration as a petition for recognition, see DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLA-
RATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2007). For a recent reinterpretation of the
Declaration that emphasizes the economic and developmental dimensions of the revolutionary
grievances, see STEVE PINCUS, THE HEART OF THE DECLARATION: THE FOUNDERS’ CASE FOR AN
ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT (2016).
32. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 991.
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that the people would resist wars because they bore the costs in
blood and treasure.33 Vesting this power in the people, through their
direct representatives in Congress, was one of the most radically re-
publican elements in the Constitution, at once distinguishing it from
European kingdoms and intending to contribute to the Enlighten-
ment project of reducing the propensity for war.34 Again, muting
popular passions in diplomatic and commercial relations, while en-
suring that popular concerns about taxation and bodily security
were activated when determining the question of war, were together
supposed to generate a new kind of state, a fiscal-commercial
state.35 And that state was supposed to fit sociably, therefore prof-
itably, within the traditional community of civilized states.36
B. European Audiences for the Constitution: Friends, Enemies,
and Debt
The European audiences for American constitution-making can
be divided roughly in two: former wartime enemies and wartime
friends. All were concerned about debt. The desire to collect out-
standing debts did not exhaust Europeans’ interest in the American
political system, but it was a common denominator. It also epito-
mized the hard—but in the eighteenth century, hopeful—fact of
economic integration. Credit, the flip side of debt, symbolized
complicated networks of exchange, some that preceded the Revolu-
tion and others forged in it. Few wanted those relationships to end.
The most important audience was the British, the recent enemy.
In the imperial economy, most credit circulating in the American
colonies had originated in key British trading cities, not just London
but also Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool, and other seaports.37 Goods
were continuously bought and sold, but coin rarely changed hands.38
Imperial trade ran instead on credit: bonds, promissory notes,
33. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
259-73 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776); see Golove & Hulsebosch,
Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 1011-15.
34. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 1011-15.
35. See id. at 993-94, 1011-15.
36. See id. at 970.
37. See JACOB M. PRICE, CAPITAL AND CREDIT IN BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE: THE VIEW FROM
THE CHESAPEAKE, 1700-1776, at 68-69 (1980).
38. See generally id.
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letters of credit, and simple contracts on open accounts.39 It was a
complicated skein of obligation in which debtors restructured old
loans, opened new credit lines, and borrowed from multiple creditors
simultaneously without disclosing existing debts.40 This commercial
world did not neatly divide debtors and creditors. Most merchants
and producers were both.41 This was true even of the large Scottish
and English creditors to whom North Americans, especially Vir-
ginians, owed millions of pounds of sterling.42 These transatlantic
traders were in turn indebted to domestic Britons who lent their
spare capital to overseas trading firms.43 They were trading with
other people’s money. But they owed those people a steady rate of
return. Like banks, they lent in multiples of their reserves.44
American private debts to British creditors were, therefore, rarely
fully retired but instead extended and refinanced.45 Within the
colonies, debts originating in the ports fractionated and multiplied
throughout the towns and backcountry, and they similarly cycled
around for years.46 This continuous process of restructuring and
holding settlement in abeyance was evidence of the confidence and
optimism undergirding the imperial credit system. Despite occa-
sional credit crises during the colonial period, liberal credit permit-
ted Britain’s imperial economy to expand faster than any of its
competitors in the eighteenth century.47
39. See generally id.
40. The best source on the mechanics and operation of the imperial trading economy in
the eighteenth century is the oeuvre of Jacob M. Price. See, e.g., id.
41. See id. at 44.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 59-60.
45. See id. at 5-6.
46. See id. at 16.
47. Price examines the diversified, fractional capitalization and liberal lending practices
of British merchants in PRICE, supra note 37. See also Emory G. Evans, Planter Indebtedness
and the Coming of the Revolution in Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 511 (1962); Richard B.
Sheridan, The British Credit Crisis of 1772 and the American Colonies, 20 J. ECON. HIST. 161
(1960). To some contemporary observers the continuous debt was more sinister. See PRICE,
supra note 37, at 5-6. Thomas Jefferson estimated that Virginians owed half of American
private debt to British creditors. See id. “The advantages made by the British merchants on
the tobaccoes consigned to them,” he maintained,
were so enormous that they spared no means of increasing those consignments.
A powerful engine for this purpose was the giving good prices and credit to the
planter, till they got him more immersed in debt than he could pay without
selling his lands or slaves. They then reduced the prices given for his tobacco so
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The Revolution sent this circulatory system into arrest. The
peacemakers tried to resuscitate the system. Fellow subjects before
the war, who had operated within and against the confines of im-
perial law, now found themselves negotiating what had become an
international relationship under the Treaty of Peace (1783) and the
law of nations.48 The peace commissioners who charted the new
relationship were intimately familiar with the old one. The Scot
Richard Oswald and the South Carolinian Henry Laurens had long
been central players in the Anglo-American credit system.49 Before
the war, Laurens had been Oswald’s slave-trading agent in South
Carolina.50 Two other commissioners, Englishman David Hartley
and Philadelphia’s Benjamin Franklin, had moved through the
same intellectual circles, including the Bowood Circle, a group of
Enlightenment intellectuals who met regularly in the country house
of their patron, the Earl of Shelburne.51 It was no coincidence that
Shelburne led the administration that negotiated peace.52 He (like
Adam Smith) had long imagined a less formal, more open, and more
commercially robust relationship between Britain and North Amer-
ica.53 Not the way he had hoped, but the opportunity arrived in
1782.54
that let his shipments be ever so great, and his demand of necessaries ever so
oeconomical, they never permitted him to clear off his debt. These debts had
become hereditary from father to son for many generations, so that the planters
were a species of property annexed to certain mercantile houses in London.
Additional Queries, with Jefferson’s Answers, in 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 20, 27
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954). See generally HERBERT E. SLOAN, PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST: THOM-
AS JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF DEBT (1995) (analyzing Jefferson’s thoughts about debt
and his financial indebtedness). Contrary to Jefferson’s reckoning, Price estimates that
British merchants purchased (rather than accepted on consignment) more than half of the
tobacco they exported out of America. PRICE, supra note 37, at 6.
48. See DAVID HANCOCK, CITIZENS OF THE WORLD: LONDON MERCHANTS AND THE INTE-
GRATION OF THE BRITISH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 1735-1785, at 391-95 (1995).
49. See id. at 391.
50. Id. at 391 n.13.
51. See generally AN ENLIGHTENMENT STATESMAN IN WHIG BRITAIN: LORD SHELBURNE IN
CONTEXT, 1737-1805, at 197, 205 (Nigel Aston & Clarissa Campbell Orr eds., 2011) (exploring
several dimensions of Shelburne’s Bowood Circle).
52. See Andrew Stockley, Shelburne, the European Powers, and the Peace of 1783, in AN
ENLIGHTENMENT STATESMAN IN WHIG BRITAIN: LORD SHELBURNE IN CONTEXT, supra note 51,
at 177, 178.
53. See id. at 178-79.
54. See id. Benjamin Vaughan, Shelburne’s private secretary at the negotiations and
Franklin’s good friend, spent much of the 1780s championing Adam Smith’s vision of free
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This premise was explicit. Article IV of the Treaty of Peace pro-
vided that creditors “shall meet with no lawful impediment to the
recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts
heretofore contracted.”55 Lord Shelburne had instructed the British
peace commissioners that “the debts require the most serious atten-
tion,—that honest debts may be honestly paid in honest money,—no
Congress money.”56 Sterling was the currency demanded, of course.
It was a hard-won provision for the British, though in the end it was
American commissioner John Adams who seemed most committed
to the ideal beneath it.57 He arrived in Paris to find a deadlock over
whether the United States would agree that debtors should fully
repay prewar debts, and whether Congress would pledge to restore
confiscated loyalist property.58 For practical and legal reasons, the
Americans would not budge on confiscated property; in the end
Congress only pledged in Article V that it would “earnestly recom-
mend” that the states restore at least some confiscated estates.59
Debt was different. “I have no notion of cheating anybody,” Adams
declared when he got to Paris and swung the American commission-
ers over to the British position on the prewar debts.60 To test this
pledge, British creditors sued in all open courts, petitioned every
political institution on both sides of the Atlantic, and lobbied anyone
trade as a mechanism for prosperity and peace. See Andrew Hamilton, Benjamin Vaughan
on Commerce and International Harmony in the Eighteenth Century, in SOCIABILITY AND COS-
MOPOLITANISM: SOCIAL BONDS ON THE FRINGES OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 101, 106-07 (Scott
Breuninger & David Burrow eds., 2012).
55. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 82.
56. 3 LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE, LIFE OF WILLIAM, EARL OF SHELBURNE, AFTERWARDS
FIRST MARQUESS OF LANDSDOWNE, WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE
282-83, 285 (1876) (excerpting Shelburne’s instruction to peace commissioners).
57. 3 JOHN ADAMS, 1782. November 3 Sunday, in DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
ADAMS 43, 43-44 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961); see also RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS:
THE GREAT POWERS AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 361 (1965).
58. See MORRIS, supra note 57, at 361.
59. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 55, at 82 (“Congress shall earnestly recommend
it to the legislatures of the respective states, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights
and properties, which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the
estates, rights and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of his Majesty’s
arms, and who have not borne arms against the said United States. And that persons of any
other description shall have free liberty to go to any part or parts of any of the thirteen United
States, and therein to remain twelve months, unmolested in their endeavours to obtain the
restitution of such of their estates, rights and properties, as may have been confiscated.”).
60. See MORRIS, supra note 57, at 361. For analysis of the legal differences between
property and debts, see infra Part II.A.
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who would listen.61 Because they formed a powerful force in British
politics, their claims became the leading diplomatic issue between
Britain and the United States from the Treaty of Peace until at least
the Jay Treaty (1794).62
Negotiating the division of the Empire and the independence of
a new nation, the peacemakers and successive diplomats believed
that enduring structures of commerce could keep Britain and Amer-
ica together in an extra-national commercial network.63 There was
no formal sense that there was to be some kind of special relation.64
Quite the opposite for the Americans. For them, the treaty’s finan-
cial guarantees, especially, provided ground rules by which the
imperial connection became an international one, and those rules
would apply to other relationships, too.65 Yet there would be, more
or less, business as usual.66 What historians later termed the
“imperialism of free trade,” and dated to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, originated, institutionally at least, in the Enlightenment ideal
of insulating international commerce from political recrimination
61. See infra Part II.A; see also Hulsebosch, Discrete and Cosmopolitan, supra note 1, at
833-35 (describing loyalists’ attempts to recover property).
62. The Jay Treaty established a precedent-setting bilateral arbitral commission that
attempted to settle the debts issue. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Gr. Brit-
U.S., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1794 [hereinafter Jay Treaty], reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL ADJU-
DICATIONS 5, 5-7 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1931).
63. See Hamilton, supra note 54, at 106-07.
64. Cf. CHRISTOPHER JOHN BARTLETT, “THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”: A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1945 (1992) (arguing that the United States and Great
Britain coordinated foreign policy in the Cold War era).
65. The Constitution’s guarantee of enforcement of past and future treaties was not
limited to Britain, of course. The argument here is that the Anglo-American relationship after
the Revolution was different because of the preexisting commercial relations, but the legal
framework built to support that relationship could, and was expected to, apply to other
commercial relations.
66. Trading firms in Great Britain sought to revive pre-revolutionary networks soon after
the Treaty of Peace. By contrast, trading between the United States and the British West
Indies was not quickly revived and was a central goal of American diplomacy. FREDERICK W.
MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
65-75 (1973).
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during the aftermath of imperial civil war.67 And it was negotiated
mutually, not imposed east to west.68
The second general audience—friends—included treaty partners
during or after the war, as well as their subjects. Those friends had
lent money to Congress and the individual states, without which the
Revolution would have failed.69 Owners of this public foreign debt
included sovereign governments, such as France and Spain, and al-
so private individuals and partnerships in France and especially the
Netherlands.70 After the peace, some of these creditors, notably the
French government, faced desperate straits and sought repayment.71
The Confederation, however, defaulted on its loans to France and
Spain, and although it was more scrupulous with Dutch creditors,
even with them it avoided default through restructuring, taking out
new loans to meet interest payments.72 Brokers then offered this
public debt to hundreds of private investors. They too became part
of the international audience. Dutch bankers and investors as-
sociated with the Dutch Patriot Party, in particular, sympathized
with the revolutionary republic, identifying it with their own eight-
decade quest for independence from the Spanish Empire.73 Some
67. See John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade, 6 ECON. HIST.
REV. 1 (1953); see also NICHOLAS ONUF & PETER ONUF, NATIONS, MARKETS, AND WAR: MODERN
HISTORY AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 187-89 (2006); JAY SEXTON, DEBTOR DIPLOMACY:
FINANCE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 1837-1873, at 2-3 (2005);
Daniel Hulsebosch, Magna Carta for the World?: The Merchants’ Chapter and Foreign Capital
in the Early American Republic, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016); Cathy Matson & Peter Onuf,
Toward a Republican Empire: Interest and Ideology in Revolutionary America, 37 AM. Q. 496
(1985).
68. See MORRIS, supra note 57, at 361.
69. See RAFAEL A. BAYLEY, THE NATIONAL LOANS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM JULY 4,
1776, TO JUNE 30, 1880, at 5-17 (2d ed. 1882).
70. See id.
71. The contribution of the American debt to French fiscal woes in the 1780s, and the
causal relationship between those financial problems and the Revolution of 1789, is hotly
debated in the historiography of the French Revolution. See, e.g., MICHAEL SONENSCHER,
BEFORE THE DELUGE: PUBLIC DEBT, INEQUALITY, AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (2007).
72. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 234 (“By concentrating its resources, [the Confederation]
Congress managed to save its credit in Holland, but the debt to France was sloughed off, and
when Spain did not press its claims, no payment was made.”); see also GEORGE GREEN
SHACKELFORD, JEFFERSON’S ADOPTIVE SON: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM SHORT, 1759-1848, at 71-94
(1993).
73. See 1 PIETER J. VAN WINTER, AMERICAN FINANCE AND DUTCH INVESTMENT, 1780-1805,
WITH AN EPILOGUE TO 1840, at 239 (James C. Riley ed. & trans., 1977).
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invested nervously; others watched with curiosity.74 Together, they
represented the leading edge of a foreign audience that, over the
next few decades, poured European specie into American public and
private investments.75 They too, then, were interested participants,
not just distant observers.
Just as the Revolution had fascinated Europeans, so too its after-
math remained a subject of fascination across the Atlantic World.
Friends and enemies, especially those with money at stake, paid
close attention as the new republican states moved from war to
peacetime governance.
II. BRITISH GRIEVANCES AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
A. The Anglo-American Origins of the “Critical Period”
Credit is never just a private arrangement. Lending demands
legal infrastructure.76 Historians are well aware that, after the Rev-
olution, American debtors successfully obtained debt relief from
many state legislatures.77 But creditors had leverage too.78 Because
many lines of credit in eighteenth-century North America ended in
Britain, those creditors sought aid from the British government and
supplied it with some of the best information available about the
political and legal systems of the American states.79
Information about the American political system flowing into the
British Privy Council was mountainous in extent and granular in
detail.80 Three interrelated channels of information kept the two
Secretaries of State (Home and Foreign Affairs) well informed
between the Treaty of Peace and the appointment of a Minister
74. Id.
75. See infra Part IV.
76. For currency in particular as a mode of governance, see CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING
MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM 266-94 (2014).
77. See, e.g., WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 55-61 (2007) (reviewing state debt-relief legislation).
78. See, e.g., Memorial of the Committee of Merchants Trading to North America to the
Board of Trade (Mar. 31, 1787), Foreign Office 4/5, British National Archives (describing
debtor relief laws in many states).
79. Id.
80. The main evidence comes from reading all Foreign Office files from 1783 to 1803
covering the United States, as well as many related deposits, in The National Archives of the
United Kingdom.
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Plenipotentiary to America in 1791. One was the stream of loyalist
petitions complaining about confiscation and other abuses that con-
tinued after the peace; another was a series of memorials from
British merchants detailing obstacles to debt collection; and a third
was reports from consuls in American seaports. These overlapping
sources portrayed governments willfully violating treaty obligations.
John Adams, who became the U.S. Minister to Britain in early 1785,
repeatedly requested that the two nations begin negotiations with
an eye especially toward reopening American trade directly with the
West Indies.81 “No” was the official answer from the Marquess of
Carmarthen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as long as the
United States refused to fulfill the terms of the treaty regarding
confiscated loyalist property and prewar debts.82
The stream of grievances led Carmarthen to seek an account of all
the laws in all the states that violated the Treaty of Peace.83 In Brit-
ain, government officials requested information from affected Brit-
ish merchants, some of whom were able to forward printed copies of
American legislation.84 Over in America, the task first fell to the
only British representative in America at the time, Consul General
John Temple.85 It was not easy to gather the statutes. He was re-
buffed when he asked for the assistance of John Jay, who was the
81. Before the Revolution those islands had provided a ready market for American food,
a supply of molasses to be refined in American seaports and then re-exported, and a steady
traffic for American carriers, thus supporting sailors, shipbuilders, seaports, and support
industries that sprawled across the American countryside. RICHARD PARES, YANKEES AND
CREOLES: THE TRADE BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES BEFORE THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1956). For a perceptive account of post-revolutionary debates over economic
development, see JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE PRIVILEGES OF INDEPENDENCE: NEOMERCANTILISM
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1993).
82. See Letter from Lord Caremarthen to John Adams (Feb. 28, 1786), in 2 THE DIP-
LOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM THE SIGNING OF THE
DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE, 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1783, TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION, MARCH 4, 1789, at 581, 581-82 (1837) [hereinafter DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE]
(“[W]henever America shall manifest a real determination to fulfil her part of the treaty,
Great Britain will not hesitate to prove her sincerity to cooperate.”).
83. See id. at 581-87. 
84. See, e.g., Messrs. Waddington to Mr. Frazer (Aug. 20, 1786), Foreign Office 4/4, British
National Archives (responding to the ministry’s desire to learn of “any hardships to which
British merchants are subjected by partial laws,” enclosing copy of New York’s Trespass Act,
and describing the lawsuits pursued under it).
85. See Letter from John Temple to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Feb. 4, 1786), Foreign
Office 4/4, British National Archives; Letter from John Temple to John Jay (Dec. 24, 1785),
Foreign Office 4/4, British National Archives.
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Confederation’s Foreign Secretary.86 A request for government
documents was diplomatic in nature, Jay answered, one that a mere
consul was not entitled to make.87 This was one of many occasions
when Americans reminded the British that, although the United
States had sent Adams as an envoy to London in mid-1785, Britain
had not reciprocated.88 Without assistance from any government
official, and before additional consuls arrived in America, Temple
hired lawyers across the states to gather information.89 The anti-
loyalist provisions were so numerous, diverse, and often tucked into
more general statutes that it remains difficult even today to compile
a complete list. Diplomats, lawyers, and interested parties kept
reporting new ones over the next decade.
The appointment of Temple in 1785 and additional consuls up
and down the Atlantic coast the following year opened up new con-
duits of information from America to the British government.90
Under the law of nations, consuls did not have full diplomatic sta-
tus.91 Their primary responsibility was to aid merchants of their
own nation and resolve disputes among them.92 Another important
function was to gather intelligence. They tracked trading volume,
regulations, and the changing commercial environment in their
86. Letter from John Temple to John Jay, supra note 85.
87. See Report of Secretary Jay on Reference of a Letter from the British Consul General
(Mar. 8, 1786), in 3 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 82, at 100, 101 (explaining that
Congress need not answer John Temple’s letter because it was not a direct or official appli-
cation on trade and navigation).
88. See Letter from John Adams to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Feb. 6, 1786), Foreign
Office 4/4, British National Archives.
89. Letter from John Temple to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Feb. 4, 1786), Foreign Office
4/5, British National Archives (describing the process of collecting statutes and requesting
reimbursement for lawyers’ fees).
90. See, e.g., Report of John Jay on the Preceding Letter (Oct. 17, 1787), in 3 DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 82, at 116, 117 (recognizing George Miller as consul for North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia); Report of John Jay on the Preceding Letter (Mar. 28,
1787), in 3 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 82, at 105, 107 (recognizing Phineas
Bond as consul in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland); Letter
from John Jay to John Temple (Dec. 3, 1785), in 3 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note
82, at 95, 95 (recognizing Temple as “Consul General of his Britannic Majesty”).
91. See 1 VATTEL, supra note 14, at 131 (“The consul is no public minister ... and cannot
pretend to the privileges appertaining to such character.”).
92. See id. (“Among the modern institutions for the utility of commerce, one of the most
useful is that of consuls or persons residing in the large trading cities, and especially in
foreign sea-ports, with a commission impowering them to attend to the rights and privileges
of their nation, and to terminate misunderstandings and contests among its merchants.”).
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ports, and then sent detailed reports to the Foreign Secretary.93
Because Britain did not send an official diplomatic representative
to the United States until late 1791, the consuls provided the most
reliable information on which to base policy during the constitution-
making period. They functioned much like old imperial agents had
before the Revolution.94 Some of them had been just that: middling
officials in the old empire, longtime residents who were integrated
in the social life of their ports. Temple, for example, had been
Lieutenant Governor of New Hampshire and Surveyor General of
customs.95 A native Bostonian, he married Elizabeth Bowdoin,
daughter of James Bowdoin, a merchant, massive landholder, and
the third Governor of independent Massachusetts.96 Temple had
moved from Boston to New York City, the British military head-
quarters, during the war. Now he settled there for the rest of his
life.97 From one perspective, only his address had changed.
If the consuls’ basic role was familiar, the political and legal con-
text for its performance had changed dramatically. Temple was
suddenly an alien representing a foreign government. He and the
other consuls thus began negotiating what had become an inter-
national rather than imperial relationship. No longer investigating
the enforcement and violations of the imperial Navigations Acts,
they instead detailed compliance and breach of the peace treaty and
the law of nations.98 The consuls’ correspondence back home was
93. See, e.g., JOANNE LOEWE NEEL, PHINEAS BOND: A STUDY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RE-
LATIONS, 1786-1812, at 73-79 (1968).
94. See generally DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 76-82 (2005)
(analyzing long-serving British officials in North America).
95. Preface to The Bowdoin and Temple Papers, in 9 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
HISTORICAL SOCIETY xiii, vx (1897).
96. See id. at xiv-xv. An advantageous match by any standard, it may also have protected
Temple from suffering confiscation during the war. When, during the Massachusetts ratifying
convention, the ardent Federalist Bowdoin warned that foreign “attention is drawn to the
United States; their emissaries are watching our conduct, particularly upon the present most
important occassion,” he was not speaking metaphorically. Speech of James Bowdoin, Massa-
chusetts Convention Debates (Jan. 23, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATI-
FICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1320 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1976-2017).
97. See Preface to The Bowdoin and Temple Papers, supra note 95, at xvii.
98. See, e.g., Letter from William S. Smith to John Jay (Aug. 7, 1786), in 3 DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 82, at 34, 36; Letter from John Temple to John Jay (Apr. 7,
1786), in 3 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 82, at 110, 110 (“I cannot but lament
the unhappy condition of those unfortunate people ... still held in confinement in direct
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formidable. In a typical year, Phineas Bond, the Philadelphia native
who served as the British consul in Philadelphia for decades, sent
at least a dozen long reports, including reams of trade statistics
collected on the wharves of that city, which gave his government a
good sense of the commerce flowing through the state’s busiest
port.99 His information came from personal observation and from
British and American merchants in the city.100 In a communications
loop of mutual influence, he and his mercantile sources, many of
whom had been revolutionaries, developed a critical perspective on
the problems besetting the new states.101 Together, this network
produced a substantial amount of the intelligence passed up the
decision-making chain of the British government.102
Consular fellowship was not, however, formal diplomatic respect.
In early 1785, the British Ambassador to France asked the Ameri-
can treaty commissioners in Paris—Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Jefferson, and John Adams—“how far the Commissioners can be
duly authorized to enter into any engagements with Great Britain
which it might not be in the power of any one of the States to render
totally fruitless and ineffectual.”103 It was a cardinal principle of
British diplomacy, developed first on the ground in America and
propounded repeatedly at home by Lord Sheffield, who helped
topple Shelburne’s short-run administration, that Congress could
not control the states.104 The Americans bristled at the implicit
indictment of the Confederation and refused to answer the question
in those terms. Instead of rephrasing, the Ambassador concluded
that it was too soon to negotiate a commercial treaty with the
United States. The real problem with the question is that it had no
answer, and the American commissioners knew. They also knew
violation ... of the definitive treaty of peace.”).
99. See NEEL, supra note 93, at 75-76, 106-07, 136. 
100. See id. at 44, 55.
101. See id. at 172-73.
102. See generally id.
103. Letter from Dorset to the American Commissioners (Mar. 26, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 55, 56 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).
104. See JOHN BAKER HOLROYD, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMERCE OF THE AMERICAN
STATES WITH EUROPE AND THE WEST INDIES: INCLUDING THE SEVERAL ARTICLES OF IMPORT
AND EXPORT 40-41 (1783). Sheffield derived most of his information about American trade
from former congressional diplomat Silas Deane, who did not endorse Sheffield’s conclusion.
See Walter E. Minchinton, Silas Deane and Lord Sheffield’s ‘Observations on American Com-
merce,’ 28 REVISTA DA UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA 83, 83-86 (1980).
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that everyone else knew too.105 “There is no question more frequent-
ly asked me by the foreign Ministers,” John Adams, the first minis-
ter of the United States to the Court of St. James’s, later reported
to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay,
than what can be the reason of such frequent divisions of States
in America, and of the disposition to crumble into little separate
societies, whereby there seems to be danger of multiplying the
members of the Confederation without end, or of setting up petty
Republics, unacknowledged by the Confederacy, and refusing
obedience to its laws?106
Information from British sources in the United States about the
state of British rights under the treaty left American diplomats with
little leverage in negotiations and dampened the support of even
sympathetic Britons. “[T]he existence of some of those laws in the
State of New York, and similar ones in other States,” William S.
Smith wrote Jay,
in a great degree stop the mouths of our friends here, and give
our enemies full scope to censure and abuse; they are held up as
a barrier to a treaty and further connexion; and thus justify
their own breach of faith in the retaining the posts on these
grounds.... I am clearly of opinion that a strict attention to
treaties, and a faithful discharge of national obligations, is the
sure road to national respectability.107
Smith, who was secretary to John Adams in London, traveled
throughout the continent and married Adams’s eldest daughter,
Abigail, remained optimistic that fruitful relationships remained
possible. “[W]e have it in our power to regulate the system of [the
English] Court,” he assured Jay, “that is, if we have the power
amongst ourselves of bringing our federal abilities to a point of
dignified operation.”108
105. Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 957; see also Letter from
Dorset to the American Commissioners, supra note 103, at 55-56.
106. Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Nov. 24, 1785), in 2 DIPLOMATIC CORRES-
PONDENCE, supra note 82, at 537, 538.
107. Letter from William S. Smith to John Jay, supra note 98, at 36. 
108. Letter from William S. Smith to John Jay (Aug. 20, 1786), in 3 DIPLOMATIC CORRES-
PONDENCE, supra note 82, at 38, 41. On Smith, see Marcius D. Raymond, Colonel William
2018] BEING SEEN LIKE A STATE 1261
Smith also corresponded frequently with David Hartley, the Bri-
tish peace commissioner who agreed with his friend Franklin that
the best future of human freedom lay in the American backcountry.
Hartley had favored the huge land cession included in the treaty as
a boon for the United States and for Europe’s poor. The new gov-
ernment could use land sales to pay off its debts, and the territory
would become a haven for European peasants seeking liberty and
property.109 “The European peasant who toils for his scanty suste-
nance, in penury, wretchedness, & servitude,” Hartley gushed,
will eagerly fly to this asylum for free & industrious labour. The
tide of emigration may set strongly outwards, from Scotland,
Ireland, & Canada, to this new land of promise. A very great
proportion of men in all the Countries of the world are without
property, & generally subjects to governments, of which they
have no participation, & over which they have no controul. The
congress have now opened to all the world a sale of landed
settlements, where the liberty & property of each individual, is
to be consigned to his own Custody, & defence.110
This vast land, combined with Congress’s repeated pledge to ad-
mit new states “on an equal footing with the original States,”111
could not “fail of producing great effects in the future progress of
things.”112 It could also make the new republic dangerous to Brit-
ain’s remaining North American colonies. Therefore, Hartley
thought it would be best “to encourage conciliatory & amicable
correspondence between them and their neighbours.”113 He also
warned that excluding the Americans from the West Indies could
Stephens Smith, 25 N.Y. GENEALOGICAL & BIOGRAPHICAL REC., Oct. 1894, at 153, 153-61
(1894).
109. See Letter from David Hartley to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Jan. 9, 1785), Foreign
Office 4/3, British National Archives (“The first is by the sale of lands ... to extinguish the
present national debts.”).
110. Id. Thoughts like this were not limited to philosophers, of course. These thoughts
helped stoke European investment in American land. For the galvanizing role of Adam
Smith’s writings among transatlantic liberal thinkers, especially his role as a “moral histor-
ian” who identified commercial with moral progress, see ONUF & ONUF, supra note 67, at 187-
218.
111. See, e.g., Northwest Territorial Ordinance of 1787, art. V, reprinted in Northwest
Territorial Ordinance of 1789, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a (1789).
112. Letter from David Hartley to the Marquess of Carmarthen, supra note 109.
113. Id.
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lead to “a commercial war with them,” which might redound to the
benefit of France.114
In the meantime, Americans had to reciprocate by repaying their
old debts. “Let the foundations of the New World be laid in these
principles—to discharge debts of honor and conciliation to the last
farthing,” Hartley wrote to Smith, “they may be considered as part
of the purchase of independence.”115 Contract along with property
was a key premise to the future of liberty. Adams agreed entirely.
“The Moral Character of our People is of infinitely greater worth
than all the sums in question,” he wrote from Paris during the final
peace negotiations:
The Commerce of the World is now open to Us, and our Exports
and Imports are of So large amount, and our Connections will be
so large and extentensive that the least Stain upon our Charac-
ter in this respect will loose [sic] Us in a very short time
Advantages of greater pecuniary Value than all our Debt
amounts to.... To talk of a Spung [sic] to wipe out this Debt, or
of reducing or diminishing it, below its real Value ... would
betray a total Ignorance of the first Principles of national Duty
and Interest.116
Two legal factors distinguished debt from land. Both derived from
the law of nations. First, many lawyers on both sides of the Atlan-
tic believed that, under the modern interpretation of the laws of
war, belligerent powers should not—perhaps could not—confiscate
114. Id. Hartley had received a copy of Congress’s Land Ordinance of 1784 (Apr. 23, 1784)
possibly from Thomas Jefferson, whom he met in Paris in late 1784, and he enclosed it in a
letter to Secretary of State Lord Carmarthen soon afterward. See Letter from David Hartley
to Marquess Carmarthen (Jan. 16, 1785), Foreign Office 4/3, British National Archives. For
Hartley’s meeting with Jefferson, where the American minister to France gave Hartley a copy
of a map he drafted plotting six new states in the Ohio Valley, see Julian P. Boyd, Editorial
Note to Plan for Government of the Western Territory, in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
581, 592-93 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952). The seventh section of the Land Ordinance of 1784,
which Jefferson drafted, provided that territories carved out of the western cession would be
admitted on “an equal footing” with the original thirteen states, once they had as many “free
inhabitants” as the least populous of the original states. For the 1784 Ordinance, see The
Ordinance of 1784, in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 613, 613-15.
115. Letter from David Hartley to William S. Smith (Dec. 1, 1786), in 3 DIPLOMATIC COR-
RESPONDENCE, supra note 82, at 56, 57.
116. Letter from John Adams to Robert Morris (July 11, 1783), in 15 PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 100, 101 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 2010).
2018] BEING SEEN LIKE A STATE 1263
certain kinds of debt. This was not a hard-and-fast prohibition, even
under the contested standards of what counted as a binding prin-
ciple under the eighteenth-century law of nations. But European
legal thinkers had begun to classify capital as a species of personal
property different from booty on land and prizes at sea.117 The fa-
mous case of Silesian loan (1753), which involved the Prussian
King’s sequestration of debts owed to British lenders, stood for the
proposition that public debt contracts, at least, were immune from
confiscation under the laws of war.118 Five years later, Emer de
Vattel distinguished public debts owed to an enemy, which the
indebted belligerent could never confiscate, from private debts,
which under the ancient laws of war could be confiscated or se-
questered during the war.119 He observed, however, that contempo-
rary European nations refrained from confiscating private debts “in
regard to the advantage and safety of commerce.”120 Already, Vattel
maintained that the non-expropriation principle, originating with
public contracts, was implied in every international private debt
contract between Europeans.121
To bolster the protection of creditors in Article IV, diplomats,
lawyers, and pamphleteers on both sides of the Atlantic repeatedly
invoked both the Silesian loan principle, protecting public con-
tracts, and Vattel’s argument that the principle had spread, in
Europe at least, to private contracts. John Jay, while serving as the
Confederation’s Foreign Secretary, advised Congress that although
the law of nations, “strictly and rigidly considered,” permitted the
confiscation of debts, “since mankind have become more enlighten-
ed, and their manners more softened and humanized, it has not
been common as well for those reasons, as for others suggested by
the interest of Commerce and mutual intercourse, to practise such
severities.”122 Within several years of the peace treaty, American
lawyers such as Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, and a young
James Kent embraced that emerging norm as part of the modern
117. See MORRIS, supra note 57, at 361.
118. See generally ERNEST SATOW, THE SILESIAN LOAN AND FREDERICK THE GREAT (1915).
119. See 2 VATTEL, supra note 14, at 28.
120. Id.
121. Id. (“[Any belligerent] act[ing] contrary to it would injure the public faith; for strangers
trusted his subjects only from a firm persuasion that the general custom would be observed.”).
122. Report from John Jay to Congress (Oct. 13, 1786), in 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 781, 801 (1934).
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law of nations and even implicitly as part of American constitutional
law.123 Their embrace of this principle with an enthusiasm beyond
that found in Europe, and contrary at least to short-term national
interest, was part of the way these Americans performed mem-
bership in the European-centered world of the law of nations. They
also reshaped that law.124 Their focus was on long-term American
national development, where they believed legal duty and national
interest converged happily.
The second legal difference was between the people who were
targeted by property confiscation and those who were creditors.
Although there was overlap, generally those who had lost property
were, in American eyes, disloyal citizens and possibly traitors, de-
spite their desire to remain British colonists.125 Americans viewed
most creditors, by contrast, as “real” British subjects: born or re-
siding in Britain, though usually with local factors in the colonies
who might also be British-born subjects. Interpolating the term
“real British subjects” into the treaty, the American commissioners
sought to distinguish between disloyal citizens and enemy aliens.126
123. On the evolving principle of debt’s immunity from confiscation in wartime, see
Hulsebosch, supra note 67, at 1630-31. For early Americans’ more ambivalent approach to
confiscation of other kinds of property, particularly property in enslaved persons, see JOHN
FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 72-77 (2012).
124. There is no discussion of the Treaty’s prohibition in Article IV (let alone the non-
impairment principle) in CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913), and only passing mention of Article IV in HOLTON,
supra note 77, at 232, and MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43-45 (2016).
125. Article V’s pledge that Congress would recommend that the states restore property
confiscated during the war distinguished among three different classes of people: first, “real
British subjects”; second, “persons resident” in royal sectors during the war “who ha[d] not
borne arms”; and third, “persons of any other description.” See Definitive Treaty of Peace,
supra note 55, at 82. Americans believed that the first category, “real British subjects,” in-
cluded short-term or nonresident British landholders who only constituted a small minority
of those targeted, while the other two categories embraced people who the revolutionaries
considered to be disloyal citizens. See James H. Kettner, The Development of American
Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional Allegiance, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
208, 218 (1974).
126. See Kettner, supra note 125, at 218. To the British government, however, the colonial-
born or long-resident “loyalists” were just as much British subjects as those who lived and
traded there temporarily, or who never left Britain at all. Compare Letter from James Duane
& Ezra L’Hommedieu to Governor George Clinton (Oct. 15, 1783), in 8 PUBLIC PAPERS OF
GEORGE CLINTON: FIRST GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK at 259, 263 (1904) (maintaining that the
category of “real British subjects” covered “the subjects of Britain whose only particular
Interest in America consisted in holding Lands & Property”), with GEORGE CHALMERS,
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Article V, covering real property, dealt with the overlap by includ-
ing special protection for “real British subjects” who lost land127:
people such as transient and temporary royal governors, for ex-
ample, whom Americans could not and did not consider to be cit-
izens of their new states.128 Those people could safely seek recovery
of their land (with no guarantees).129 Article IV, by contrast, did not
specify how to treat loyalist creditors.130 Confusion, disagreement,
and diplomatic controversy about whether Article IV’s guarantee
applied to those loyalists lasted for decades.131
This emerging norm protecting prewar debts, combined with
Americans’ continued reliance on transatlantic capital, helps ex-
plain why few Americans proposed outright repudiation of foreign
debt, even the debt owed to former enemies. Nor did many wish to
repay existing debts and then forswear credit in the future. There
were continual anxieties about the corrupting effect of imported
luxuries, rebellions against debt collection in periods of currency
shortage, and even proposals for insulating the economy.132 But,
OPINIONS ON INTERESTING SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC LAW AND COMMERCIAL POLICY; ARISING FROM
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 8-9 (1784) (denying any such distinction under English law).
Historians often misinterpret this distinction, reading “real British subjects” as connoting
metropolitan condescension toward North Americans. Cf. MAYA JASANOFF, LIBERTY’S EXILES:
AMERICAN LOYALISTS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WORLD 122 (2011). The distinction between
loyalists and real British subjects was litigated in American and British courts into the
nineteenth century. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Declaration’s Domestic International
Effects, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 354 (2008) (reviewing DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2007)) (discussing court cases that “worked through the
domestic consequences of international recognition”).
127. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 55, at 82 (allowing for the “restitution of all
estates, rights and properties, which have been confiscated, belonging to real British sub-
jects”).
128. See Hulsebosch, supra note 126, at 356.
129. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 55, at 82-83; see also Case of Bishop Inglis,
in 3 INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 62, at 98-100.
130. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 55, at 82.
131. See, e.g., Case of Bishop Inglis, supra note 129; Case of Andrew Allen, in 3 INTER-
NATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 62, at 238 (detailing the claims of Charles Inglis and
Andrew Allen under the Jay Treaty commission).
132. See TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE
TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 88-104 (2007) (discussing the postwar
recession and its impact on small debtors); T.H. BREEN, THE MARKETPLACE OF REVOLUTION:
HOW CONSUMER POLITICS SHAPED AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 182-87 (2004) (exploring
revolutionary ambivalence about commerce and luxury); HOLTON, supra note 77, at 46-54
(arguing that critics of American debtors blamed penchant for luxury consumption); Edmund
S. Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 8 (1967)
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pace American historians’ fascination with Shays’s tax rebellion in
Massachusetts, none of it ever got far. Debt relief stemmed more
from currency shortages and the postwar recession than from re-
sistance to a credit-financed economy.133
Congress asked John Jay, Adams’s colleague at the Paris negotia-
tions and now Congress’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to investigate
the states’ performance of the treaty guarantees, and he expressed
his shock at the willful violations.134 Congress endorsed Jay’s report
and asked him to draft a circular of resolutions, which it sent to the
states recommending that they repeal any legislation inconsistent
with the treaty and, if they had not already, begin enforcing its
provisions.135 “History furnishes no precedent of such liberties taken
with treaties under form of Law in any nation,” Congress lectured
the states a month before the beginning of the Philadelphia
Convention.136 “Not only the obvious dictates of religion, morality,
and national honor,” it continued, “but also the first principles of
good policy, demand a candid and punctual compliance with
engagements constitutionally and fairly made.”137
 Jay’s elephantine report got Congress’s attention. “If Congs.
should be able to agree on any measures for carrying the Treaty into
execution,” James Madison wrote home to Virginia Governor
Edmund Randolph after perusing the report, “it seems probable that
the fundamental one will be a summons of the States to remove all
legal impediments which stand at present in the way.”138 Besides
being the right thing to do, complying with the Treaty of Peace was
the only way to bring Britain back to the negotiating table: “There
seems to be no reason to believe that G. B. will comply on any other
(connecting Puritan self-discipline to the boycotts).
133. See Sonia Mittal et al., The Constitutional Choices of 1787 and Their Consequences,
in FOUNDING CHOICES: AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S, at 25, 34 (Douglas A. Irwin
& Richard Sylla eds., 2011); Peter L. Rousseau, Monetary Policy and the Dollar, in FOUNDING
CHOICES, supra, at 121, 125, 139-145. See generally FERGUSON, supra note 4.
134. Report from John Jay to Congress, supra note 122.
135. See Congress, Resolutions (Mar. 21, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS 1774-1789, at 123, 124-25 (1936).
136. Congress to the States (Apr. 13, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS 1774-1789, supra note 135, at 176, 180.
137. Id. at 177.
138. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 18, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 271, 271 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975).
2018] BEING SEEN LIKE A STATE 1267
conditions than those signified in the communication of Lord Car-
marthen to Mr. Adams.”139
International morality and national interest coincided here as
elsewhere. As usual, it was difficult to pry the two apart, but there
is little reason to think that realism led the way. Madison’s
relentless opposition to paper money at home in Virginia,140 while
at the same time advocating trade discrimination as a diplomatic
weapon,141 fit the conventional morality of the law of nations.142
Trade discrimination was a short-term measure. Raising the cost of
or even excluding British goods would, he predicted, force Britain to
liberalize its imperial trade network and readmit the American
provinces, now under an international treaty rather than pursuant
to the municipal Navigation Acts.143 Whatever the fate of the bal-
ance of power as a political ideal, Americans and especially South-
erners had faith that it could succeed as an economic one.144
While proposing trade discrimination, Madison adamantly op-
posed debt relief at home,145 and his stance may have contributed to
his near defeat in his first congressional election, when Governor
Patrick Henry openly embraced his Antifederalist opponent for the
House, James Monroe.146 Madison construed American interest in
line with the law of nations and took the long view on the prospects
for economic development.147 Finance mattered imperatively, trade
was the aim, and a nation could withdraw the latter as leverage in
negotiations.148 But if the goal was long-term integration and
139. Id.
140. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 44 (1996).
141. See CROWLEY, supra note 81, at 97.
142. Cf. Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order, 51 INT’L
AFFAIRS 358 (1975) (questioning the legality of economic sanctions in the twentieth-century
legal order).
143. Madison sought to “discriminate against British trade, in order to coerce Britain to
privilege American commerce as though it were British.” CROWLEY, supra note 81, at 104-05.
144. See id. at 97, 117-21.
145. See RAKOVE, supra note 140, at 44.
146. See Editorial Note, Madison’s Election to the First Federal Congress (October 1788-
February 1789 ), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F.
Hobson eds., 1977).
147. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 138, at 345, 349-50.
148. See CROWLEY, supra note 81, at 99, 104.
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development, fiddling with currency to aid local interests was dou-
bly wrong: illegal and counterproductive.149
Madison read Jay’s report just as he began to collate what he
called the “Vices of the Political System of the States.”150 Perhaps
the most famous personal memorandum of the revolutionary era,
historians have connected its criticisms directly to Madison’s Vir-
ginia Plan for constitutional reform.151 Take a closer look at some of
the “political vices” that Madison famously identified in the spring
of 1787.152 After beginning with state failures to supply their
requisitions to Congress, the second “vice” Madison identified was
state “[e]ncroachments ... on the federal authority.”153 Although such
encroachments were “numerous,” the first example he used to il-
lustrate this vice was “the wars and Treaties of Georgia with the
Indians,”154 a complaint that raised two Federalist grievances:
decentralized war and treaty-making, and also uncontrolled western
settlement, aided and abetted by some states.155 “Violations of the
law of nations and of treaties” was third on his list.156 Attempting to
understand the political sociology that had produced such policies,
he observed,
From the number of [state] Legislatures, the sphere of life from
which most of their members are taken, and the circumstances
under which their legislative business is carried on, irregulari-
ties of this kind must frequently happen. Accordingly not a year
149. See RAKOVE, supra note 140, at 44.
150. See Madison, supra note 147.
151. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 140, at 46-56, 101. Mary Bilder has suggested, after
carefully sorting through Madison’s notes surrounding the Convention, that he did not have
a coherent theory of interest-based republicanism before arriving in Philadelphia but instead
developed it during and after the Constitutional Convention. The “Vices” memo, in particular,
might have been a work-in-progress, revised over time, rather than a complete theory. MARY
SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 44-45, 243-44
(2015). Bilder demonstrates once again that constitutional reform remained a dynamic exper-
iment before, during, and after the Convention. Id. The point here is that Jay’s detailed legal
analysis of the states’ violations of international law was a crucial catalyst in that reform
effort.
152. See Madison, supra note 147.
153. Id. at 348.
154. Id.
155. See PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 94-95 (1993).
156. Madison, supra note 147, at 349.
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has passed without instances of them in some one or other of the
States. The Treaty of peace—the treaty with France—the treaty
with Holland have each been violated.... The causes of these
irregularities must necessarily produce frequent violations of the
law of nations in other respects.157
He proceeded in the next item—“Trespasses of the States on the
rights of each other”—to decry the epidemic of debtor relief laws.158
“Paper money, instalments [sic] of debts, occlusion of Courts, mak-
ing property a legal tender, may likewise be deemed aggressions on
the rights of other States.”159 These state laws targeted not only in-
state creditors, but also creditors from other states and from “for-
eign nations.”160 The Articles of Confederation did give Congress
“the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and
value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the res-
pective States.”161 However, that was worthless without the power
to block debtor relief laws.162 Consequently, the federal government
needed power “to prevent those frauds on the citizens of other
States, and the subjects of foreign powers, which might disturb the
tranquility at home, or involve the Union in foreign contests.”163 The
problems of congressional weakness and state oppression combined
in debtor relief laws, where public opinion followed the lowest
common denominator, local interests ganged up on interstate and
foreign ones, other states retaliated, and there was no way for
people with foresight to coordinate at a higher level of government
and formulate better policy.164
Historians have focused on Madison’s concern for the interstate,
or national, public good. His theory of factional checks and balances
is why many consider him the most thoughtful constitution mak-
er.165 At the Convention, he sought “a strong enegetic government”
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
162. See Madison, supra note 147, at 349-50.
163. Id. at 350.
164. Id. at 349-50.
165. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 26, at 350-52 (James Madison); see also
Madison, supra note 147, at 355-57.
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that would also prevent the state legislatures from invading private
rights.166 But more “energetic” in pursuit of what end? And whose
rights? For him, this problem was inextricably tied to a larger good,
as revealed when his examples shifted subtly from the interstate to
the international. “Is it to be imagined,” he queried, “that an ordi-
nary citizen or even an assembly-man of R. Island in estimating the
policy of paper money, ever considered or cared in what light the
measure would be viewed in France or Holland; or even in Massts
or Connect.?”167 Similarly, inconsistent trade laws among the states
were “a snare not only to our citizens but to foreigners also.”168
Madison did not, of course, work to create a Constitution primarily
for the benefit of those “foreigners.”169 Still, their rights—rights bas-
ed on treaties and the law of nations, respect for which would re-
dound to the benefit of the United States—were at the forefront of
his mind when he analyzed the structure of constitutional govern-
ment.170 In his concern about the international dimensions of con-
stitutional reform, at least, Madison was not unusual.171
Foreign criticism demonstrated to many Americans that although
it might be possible for a confederation to operate with decentraliz-
ed power internally, it would not be seen as a full-fledged nation for
international purposes.172 And those purposes included making more
than symbolic commercial treaties, such as that with Prussia in
1785.173 Some took another step: without full commercial and dip-
lomatic relations, it was not possible for a decentralized polity to
166. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 472 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911); see also Madison, supra note 147, at 354.
167. Madison, supra note 147, at 355-56.
168. Id. at 354.
169. See, e.g., CROWLEY, supra note 81, at 97.
170. See Madison, supra note 147, at 349.
171. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 980-1015.
172. See DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 104-05 (David
Robertson ed., 2d ed. 1805) [hereinafter DEBATES] (transcribing James Madison’s speech at
the Convention of Virginia); see also PETER P. HILL, FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1783-1793, at 111-12 (1988).
173. See DEBATES, supra note 172, at 104-05 (transcribing James Madison’s speech at the
Convention of Virginia); see also MARKS, supra note 66, at 154; ONUF & ONUF, supra note 155,
at 101-02.
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function well, even internally.174 The pathologies flowing from in-
effective foreign relations flowed both ways. Increasingly, it was
impossible to separate internal from external dimensions of the
revolutionary experiment.
B. The Constitutional Infrastructure of International Commerce
The communications circuit that carried information both ways
across the Atlantic therefore deeply affected American constitution-
making. Most historians instead treat foreign affairs as a discrete
contributing factor and interpret its influence through a realist lens
emphasizing national security.175 The intrinsically sociable and
integrating premise beneath the critique of the critical period,
however, puts constitutional reform in another light. Bare national
security was not the goal. The Federalists, as well as many of their
opponents, sought much more than that (commercial development),
and also a bit less (no permanent defense establishment).176 They
sought national development in hopes of fulfilling a revolutionary
vision of thriving seaports, fully engaging in the Atlantic world of
commerce, and of American settlers developing the backcountry at
a moderate or (for some) fast pace, turning the vast treaty cession
into a series of equal states.177 Achieving these goals required that
Americans attract overseas trade, foreign investors, and emi-
174. See, e.g., James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 1006,
1034 (recording Madison’s speech at the Virginia ratifying convention, complaining that “[t]he
Confederation is so notoriously feeble, that foreign nations are unwilling to form any treaties
with us”).
175. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 66, at 3 (discussing how “individual states undercut
congressional prerogative in foreign relations and jeopardized the security of the entire na-
tion”). On constitutional reform generally, see RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE
UNION, 1781-1789, at 194-96 (1987); ONUF & ONUF, supra note 155; and JACK N. RAKOVE, THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS (1979).
176. The Constitution empowered Congress “[t]o raise and support Armies” but such
appropriations to two years maximum. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
177. For the Enlightenment debates over the relationship between sociablility, commerce,
and international integration, see ISTVAN HONT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COM-
PETITION AND THE NATION-STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2005); and ANTHONY PAGDEN,
THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND WHY IT STILL MATTERS (2013). On western settlement, see PETER
S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1987).
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grants.178 Trade, finance, and labor were therefore central to the
constitutional vision,179 as the document and the debates made
clear.180 Attracting these factors of development required, the
constitution makers believed, careful attention to treaties and the
law of nations, attention that is apparent in the constitutional text,
its gloss, and surrounding contestation over how best to construct
the document as a government.181
Before exploring the text and the ratification debate, two his-
toriographical monuments deserve attention. First, Charles Beard
famously argued a century ago that the Federalists manufactured
their Constitution to guarantee that the federal government would
pay congressional debt in which they had heavily invested.182
Attacked repeatedly for its empirical claim, Beard’s “economic in-
terpretation of the Constitution” still shapes much investigation
into the making and ratification of the Constitution.183 Beard was
half right. Economics, and specifically finance, did matter.184 But the
178. For a contemporary statement of the relationship of the Constitution to political
economy of an emerging nation, see John Jay, An Address to the People of the State of New-
York on the Subject of the Constitution (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 67
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888); see also THOMAS K. MCCRAW, THE FOUNDERS AND FINANCE:
HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS FORGED A NEW ECONOMY 357-65 (2012)
(describing the political economy of two early Treasury Secretaries).
179. See MCCRAW, supra note 178, at 335, 354-57.
180. See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I, III, VI.
181. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 980-1061.
182. See BEARD, supra note 124, at 290-91.
183. HOLTON, supra note 77, at 7-9, 13-16, 274-78, and BOUTON, supra note 132, at 83-87,
offer variations on Beard’s theme, while a sophisticated updating of Beard’s coding of the
interests of the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying conventions
can be found in ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2003). Their work in turn shaped the
frame of Michael Klarman’s narrative of the making of the Federal Constitution. KLARMAN,
supra note 124. Klarman’s book mines the heroic 1-27 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, but his work, like Holton’s and Bouton’s,
focuses on domestic debates, not least because the Documentary History does too, though it
contains more foreign commentary than historians have hitherto noticed. In this they are all
faithful to Beard. For criticisms of Beard’s use of evidence, see ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES
BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF “AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION” (1956); and FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958). For ideological alternatives, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (enlarged ed. 1992); and, especially,
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1789 (1998).
184. See BOUTON, supra note 132, at 173-76, 178-79; HOLTON, supra note 77, at 55-95.
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creditors who mattered most were foreigners not involved directly
in the drafting and who would not staff the federal government.185
Finance mattered to the Framers because of the promise that
international credit held out for national development, not be-
cause—or not just because—of the opportunities that such develop-
ment offered specific Founders.186 If there was a conspiracy, it was
not a domestic coup, and it is unconvincing to see the international
communications circuit that generated the “critical period” diagnosis
as an international plot aided by a domestic band of suddenly anti-
revolutionary turncoats. The perception of what was learned in the
1780s about the tension between representative government and
international commerce did not amount to a Thermidorian reaction.
In fact, the Federalists believed that commercial integration had
been a goal of the Revolution.187 Reform was not an economic con-
spiracy against the Revolution but rather the pursuit of revolution-
ary political economy.188
The presence of foreign creditors in what has often been cast as
a struggle between discrete classes within the United States raises
another monument in the historiography of national development.
Douglass North and Barry Weingast argued that the development
of a more powerful Parliament after the Glorious Revolution made
Britain’s commitments to repay loans more credible.189 More public
participation in government gave investors greater confidence in
the government’s willingness and capacity to repay money.190 North
and Weingast focused on domestic creditors, using the effects of
England’s Glorious Revolution as the central example.191 The
growing strength of the Commons, and its representation of much
of the investing public, gave investors greater confidence that the
government’s commitments to repay debt were credible.192 The
185. See infra Part III.
186. See BOUTON, supra note 132, at 179.
187. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 977-79; Hulsebosch, Rev-
olutionary Portfolio, supra note 1, at 795-99 (describing the origins and purposes of the Conti-
nental Congress’s Model Commercial Treaty).
188. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 977-79.
189. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 803, 804 (1989).
190. See id. at 804-05.
191. See id.
192. See id.
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thesis has been tested or applied in various local contexts.193 The re-
lationship between foreign investment and domestic constitutional
development has by contrast been much less explored.194 What is
especially interesting about the U.S. case is that the proportion of
foreign ownership of U.S. public and private debt also increased
over time; it was not just an inheritance of postcolonial revolution.195
Because foreigners could not vote, constitution makers could not
rely on representative government as a signal of commitment, and
neither could the investors rely on that mechanism for some kind of
virtual representation. The political experience of the 1780s sug-
gested just the opposite.196
Instead, American constitution makers developed extra-represen-
tative structures to signal commitment and make it stick: separated
powers, a unified executive, and effective courts, for instance.197 The
Constitution’s infrastructure for international relations spread in
two directions. Vertically, between the federal government and the
states, the Constitution provided that the federal government would
have absolute control over war and diplomacy, as well as at least
preemptive control over international commerce, and it explicitly
disabled the states from making war, raising troops without au-
thority, and imposing external taxes.198 In short, the Constitution
centralized control over war and peaceful interaction with other na-
tions. Horizontally, the Constitution distributed the foreign affairs
powers across the three branches, adding a strong Executive, an
independent judiciary with jurisdiction over a host of cases implicat-
ing foreign affairs, and obliging all branches, as well as the states,
193. See, e.g., DAVID STASAVAGE, STATES OF CREDIT: SIZE, POWER, AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF EUROPEAN POLITIES (2011); QUESTIONING CREDIBLE COMMITMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
RISE OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM (D’Maris Coffman et al. eds., 2013).
194. A suggestive study focusing on Article III jurisdiction is Charles Anthony Smith, Cred-
ible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 75 (2008).
Cf. David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1277 (2008) (tracing commitments to human rights as a global “race to the top” and a signal
of civilization). 
195. See Peter L. Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Financial Systems, Economic Growth, and
Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 373, 383 (Michael D. Bordo et
al. eds., 2003).
196. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 147, at 349; Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation,
supra note 1, at 946-70.
197. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 940.
198. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10.
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to treat existing and future treaties as the supreme law of the
land.199 Treaty-making was the province of the President and the
Senate, not the more popular House of Representatives.200 Similarly,
the Executive would control formal diplomacy.201 However, Congress
would regulate international commerce, and it retained the ultimate
sovereign power: the power to declare war.202
In addition, a striking characteristic of all the revolutionary
constitutions was their disabling provisions. Many of these hall-
marks of the “limited government” in the Federal Constitution bore
directly on foreign affairs, again in both war and peace. Article I,
Sections 9 and 10, in the Federal Constitution, for example, prohib-
ited the federal and state governments from certain actions entirely,
and not only to preserve the lines of federalism. Neither could enact
ex post facto laws.203 Most prohibitions relative to commerce were,
however, aimed at the states.204 In addition to stripping the states
of any formal foreign affairs powers, the states could not “emit Bills
of Credit[, or] make any Thing but gold or silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts,” or make any “Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”205
Taking direct aim at the fiscal policy of several states, the prohib-
ition of state paper money and debt relief were controversial.206 Six
months before the Convention, in response to county petitions ask-
ing the Virginia legislature to print paper money, and reporting that
some colonies had used it safely before the Revolution, Madison
pleaded in the alternative.207 First, he denied that paper money ever
199. See id. arts. II, III, VI.
200. See id. art. II, § 2.
201. See id.
202. See id. art I, § 8, cls. 3, 11.
203. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
204. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 10.
205. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Convention also considered prohibiting the federal govern-
ment from issuing paper money but in the end balked, apparently not wishing to prevent the
government from issuing such as an emergency measure. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
206. For a sympathetic account of that resistance, see HOLTON, supra note 77. For the
efficacy and resistance to paper money in early America, see FERGUSON, supra note 4; see also
JOHN P. KAMINSKI, PAPER POLITICS: THE NORTHERN STATE LOAN-OFFICES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION, 1783-1790 (1989) (arguing that paper money continued to function well in
a few northern states that possessed revenue, such as customs revenue, to retire the paper).
207. See James Madison, Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money, in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 138, at 158, 158-59.
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functioned well.208 Next, he stated that the conventional wisdom
about paper money had changed since the colonial period (it was
“not then understood”) and, significantly, “w[oul]d[ ] not then, nor
now succeed in Great Britain &c.”209 Driving home the reputational
point, Madison added that if Virginia enacted a paper money
scheme, it would be “conspiring with the examples of other States
to disgrace Republican Govts. in the eyes of mankind.”210 Paper
money was just no longer, he thought, on the legislative menu for
civilized states.211 In addition, Madison argued that state paper
money threatened the interstate and international economy: it
facilitated “fraud in States towards each other or foreigners.”212 
At the Philadelphia Convention, many delegates joined Roger
Sherman on August 28 in believing that “this [is] a favorable crisis
for crushing paper money.”213 Sherman’s home state of Connecticut
had close commercial ties to Rhode Island, and merchants in the
land of steady habits had been harmed by its neighbor’s liberal
emission of paper money as legal tender that would be accepted in
Rhode Island courts to settle debts.214 Under the draft of the Con-
stitution produced by the Committee of Detail and presented to the
Convention on August 6th, the states would have been able to
request permission from Congress to emit bills of credit (which
functioned as legal tender), as they could with tonnage duties,
troops, or interstate and foreign compacts.215 Sherman proposed
instead an absolute prohibition, and only Madison’s Virginia
208. Id. at 159.
209. Id. Madison was referring to a transformation in British monetary policy, beginning
in the 1690s, that legal historian Christine Desan calls “the liberal turn to ‘gold’.” DESAN,
supra note 76, at 370-403.
210. Madison, supra note 207, at 159.
211. See id. at 158-59.
212. Id. at 159. For recent criticism of the Federalist position, see Farley Grubb, The U.S.
Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and
How a Constitutional Transformation of the Nation’s Monetary System Emerged (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11783, 2005).
213. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 205, at 439.
214. See Grubb, supra note 212, at 14-16. The tension led to proposals in the Connecticut
legislature, on the eve of the Philadelphia Convention, to introduce commodity money as legal
tender, but these failed. See, e.g., DEBATES in the House of Assembly of Connecticut, on a
TENDER ACT, WORCESTER MAG., June 1787, at 3 (reporting debates from May 1787).
215. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 205, at 435. For the Committee of Detail’s draft of this provision, see 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 205, at 144.
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delegation voted against the proposal.216 After this overwhelming
vote in favor of banning state paper money, Rufus King of Massa-
chusetts proposed copying the month-old Northwest Ordinance
and adding a prohibition on state legislation interfering with the
obligation of contracts.217 The Contract Clause passed seven states
to three.218
After the Convention, Madison recycled his notes from the debate
in the Virginia legislature to defend the bans on paper money and
debtor relief legislation in Article I, Section 10, as necessary to
restore confidence between men as well as “the character of Repub-
lican Government.”219 Different public currencies among the states
would hamper trade, “[t]he subjects of foreign powers might suffer
from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and em-
broiled by the indiscretion of a single member.”220 Connecticut’s
delegates Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth (who later drafted
the Judiciary Act) emphasized in their letter to the state governor
transmitting the draft Constitution that the prohibitions on state
bills of credit, paper money, and “impairing the obligation of con-
tracts by ex post facto laws was thought necessary as a security to
commerce, in which the interest of foreigners as well as the citizens
of different states may be affected.”221 Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina went further, embracing hard money even more tightly
than most Federalists.222 “This section,” he exclaimed about Article
216. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 205, at 439.
217. Id.
218. Id. Madison, notably, wondered aloud whether the prohibition of ex post facto laws
would prevent state interferences with contracts, making King’s proposal redundant. Id. at
440. Madison’s assumption that the Ex Post Facto Clause extended beyond criminal to civil
legislation met resistance by a Blackstone-toting John Dickinson of Delaware, which only
demonstrated to Dickinson the necessity of the Contract Clause to prohibit some ex post facto
civil legislation. See id. at 448-49.
219. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 26, at 300 (James Madison).
220. Id. at 301.
221. Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Huntington (Sept. 26,
1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 96, at 351, 352; see also James McHenry, Speech at Maryland’s Constitutional Conven-
tion (Nov. 29, 1787), in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 96, at 279, 284 (reporting the Convention’s conclusion that “the best
security that could be given for the Public faith at home and the extension of Commerce with
Foreigners”).
222. Charles Pinckney, Speech at the South Carolina Convention (May 17, 1788), in 27 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 353,
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I, Section 10, is “the soul of the constitution.”223 The prohibitions on
the states would “cultivate those principles of public honor and pri-
vate honesty which are the only sure road to national character and
happiness.”224 Silently invoking Gresham’s Law, he maintained that
revolutionary experience proved that paper money chased hard
money out of the country, disabling international trade: “[A]ll the
foreign merchants trading to America must suffer and lose by it;
therefore that it must ever be a discouragement to commerce.”225
That, he concluded, devastated the export-driven economy of South
Carolina and elsewhere.226 Like Madison, he invoked interstate
fairness and the benefits of a uniform public currency.227 “But above
all,” he insisted,
how much will this section tend to restore your credit with
foreigners—to rescue your national character from that con-
tempt which must ever follow the most flagrant violations of
public faith and private honesty. No more shall paper money—
no more shall tender laws, drive their commerce from our
shores, and darken,— ... the American name in every country
where it is known.... No more shall the widow, the orphan and
the stranger become the miserable victims of unjust rulers. Your
government shall now indeed be a government of laws.228
A government of laws did not allow local politics to interfere with
international trade.229
Similarly, during the ratification debates, North Carolina Feder-
alist Archibald Maclaine emphasized the connection between paper
money, discrimination against foreigners in the state courts, and
the economic recession.230 “The United States are, and for some
353.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 354.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 354-55.
229. See id. at 354.
230. See Archibald Maclaine, Publicola: An Address to the Freemen of North Carolina, in
16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96,
at 435, 435-39.
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years have been, without any national character,” he argued while
trying to move the reluctant state to hold a ratifying convention,
Foreigners say, and they say truly, that we have no govern-
ment—Even in this state, our policy is so wretched, that we have
lost all credit, the very soul of commerce. No foreigner, no not an
individual of any of our sister states, will trust us with a shil-
ling. Our paper money, and our judicial decisions, banish all
confidence; and the former has banished all gold and silver—Let
paper money be no longer a tender, and justice be done to those
who have transactions with us, and I will venture to assert that
we shall soon have among us, a pound value in gold and silver,
for every shilling in paper which we now possess.231
Paper money had served a valuable purpose in colonial America,
Federalists conceded. But it was not functioning as well in the
independent states. It flowed more easily across borders, rather
than remaining, more or less, local, and the states lacked realistic
plans for retiring that paper. As the United States entered a new
international economy, many Federalists concluded, it had to learn
lessons from Britain, which had good credit across Europe.232 “Were
it possible for the nations abroad to suppose Great-Britain would
emit bills on the terms whereon they have issued in America,” asked
a Maryland Federalist in January 1788,
how soon would the wide arch of that mighty empire tumble in-
to ruins? In no other country in the universe has prevailed the
idea of supplying, by promissory notes, the want of coin, for
commerce and taxes. In America, indeed, they have heretofore
served many valuable purposes.... But when every thing dem-
onstrates the season to be past; when the credit of America, in
all places, depends on the security she shall give to contracts, it
would be madness in the states to be tenacious of their right. So
long as Europe shall believe we regard not justice, gratitude and
honour, so long will America labour under the disadvantages of
231. Id. at 439.
232. See Aristides, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, in 11 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 224,
246. The editors identify the author as Alexander Contee Hanson, then a judge on the Mary-
land General Court. Id. at 224.
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an individual, who attempts to make good his way through the
world with a blasted reputation.233
Many opponents of these restrictions on state power agreed that
paper money and legislative alterations of contracts were generally
unwise policy. There were, however, special circumstances that
might justify extreme measures. This was the same logic that some
Federalists had used at the Convention to defeat the extension of
the prohibition to the federal government.234 In times of “great pub-
lic calamities and distress,” Antifederalist Luther Martin argued,
the government should “prevent the wealthy creditor and the mon-
ied man from totally destroying the poor though even industrious
debtor.”235 For men like Martin and Patrick Henry, the claim of
state necessity, itself informed by the law of nations, remained valid
for the individual states.236 At the least, they maintained in an early
instance of southern constitutional jurisprudence, the states pos-
sessed just as much right to claim it as the federal government.237
If the states could not, or on principle would not, grant debt relief,
another route to the same end ran through jury nullification.238
Henry, never afraid of smoking guns, put it more clearly than most.
The Supremacy Clause, federal courts, and the prohibition on state
debt relief would combine to ruin Virginia’s farmers.239 To top it off,
the proposed Constitution did not on its face require that the federal
courts have juries in civil cases.240 Even that safety valve for local
interests was imperiled. “If ... amendments are not obtained,” he
warned toward the end of Virginia’s convention, as ratification
233. Id. at 246-47.
234. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 205, at 308-10 (re-
cording Edmund Randoph’s statement that “nothwithstanding his antipathy to paper money,
[he] could not agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions that
might arise”).
235. See Luther Martin, Genuine Information VIII, in 11 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 196, 199.
236. Vattel, for example, sprinkled state necessity exceptions among his general principles
under the customary law of nations. See, e.g., 2 VATTEL, supra note 14.
237. See generally F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA’S
PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1828 (1994).
238. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87
IOWA L. REV. 145, 161 (2001).
239. See id. at 188-89.
240. Id. at 149.
2018] BEING SEEN LIKE A STATE 1281
seemed inevitable, “the trial by jury is gone: British debtors will be
ruined by being dragged to the Federal Court—and the liberty and
happiness of our citizens gone—never again to be recovered.”241
Edmund Randolph disagreed, at least about those debts. “The Brit-
ish debts, which are withheld contrary to treaty, ought to be paid.
Not only the law of nations, but justice and honor require that they
be punctually discharged.”242
In addition, Article VI pledged that “[a]ll Debts contracted and
Engagements entered into” before the Constitution would remain
valid against the new federal government.243 This unusual retroac-
tivity provision was followed by another, in the Supremacy Clause,
in which the new government, its courts, and state courts would
treat not only the Constitution and federal law as the supreme law
of the land, but also “all Treaties made, or which shall be made”
under the new government.244 Outstanding confederation debt and
existing treaties would bind the new government, and Article III
made clear that federal court jurisdiction would extend as well to
“[t]reaties made, or which shall be made.”245 There would be no re-
pudiation of domestic or foreign public debt, or of the private British
debts.246
Coming away from a Convention filled with compromises, the
leading Federalists tried to make sense of just how a system of
government based on it would work. What they saw was what they
had originally sought: greater insulation of foreign policy from the
state legislatures and the more democratic house of Congress.247
Hamilton’s first count in his bill of particulars against the Confed-
eration in The Federalist 15 went directly to this point: “Are there
engagements to the performance of which we are held by every tie
241. Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 23, 1788), in 10 THE DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 1464, 1466.
See generally Harrington, supra note 238 (arguing that Antifederalists demanded civil jury
to protect against a range of suits in federal courts).
242. Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 1338,
1360.
243. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
244. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
245. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
246. Id. art. VI, cls. 1-2.
247. See Golove & Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation, supra note 1, at 980-1015; Golove &
Hulsebosch, Known Opinion, supra note 1.
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respectable among men?”248 Indeed, “[t]hese are the subjects of con-
stant and unblushing violation.”249 Beyond the repeated breaches of
the nation’s international obligations, the states had violated even
the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, which had secured their
independence and ceded territory well beyond what they could have
secured by arms.250 Citing those violations, the British retained pos-
session of several forts within U.S. territory, and, given the truth of
the charges, the Confederation could not even “remonstrate with
dignity.”251 The predictable result was a state of “national humilia-
tion ... degrad[ing to] the character of an independent nation” and
rendering the Confederation incapable of even acting the part of a
civilized nation: “Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a
safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our
Government even forbids them to treat with us: Our ambassadors
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.”252 So, too, was
Congress.
John Jay offered similar indictments in his early essays. Jay
wrote only four numbers, but the contributions of the Confedera-
tion’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs focused on the inefficacy of the
states’ diplomacy near and far.253 Sounding a central theme of The
Federalist, he counseled that the best defense against foreign ag-
gressions was preemptive discipline over the American states and
citizens.254 A single national government would control treaty
interpretation, rein in both state legislation and private provoca-
tions, and have the capacity, through the presidency, to negotiate
capably.255 “[A] cordial Union under an efficient national Govern-
ment, affords them the best security that can be devised against
hostilities from abroad.”256 Why? Because “the Union tends most to
preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.”257 An
effective state was a peaceful one, one able to harmonize policy,
248. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 26, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton).
249. Id.
250. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 55, at 81.
251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 26, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton).
252. Id. at 91-92.
253. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 26, at 14 (John Jay).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 14-15.
256. Id. at 14.
257. Id.
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legal interpretation of treaties and the law of nations, and the en-
forcement of both within the United States.
Hamilton and Madison elaborated that theme, focusing on
governmental rather than individual violations of the law of na-
tions. British criticism, loyalist complaints and lawsuits, and Feder-
alist legal analysis had made these violations legion. So it was
natural that Hamilton referred to foreign opinion. In Federalist 22,
for example, he cited a recent Parliamentary debate in which a
leading member argued that it was appropriate to continue with a
series of temporary, rather than permanent, commercial statutes
regulating commerce with the United States “until it should appear
whether the American government was likely or not to acquire
greater consistency.”258 Hamilton had to confess that the Member
of Parliament was right: 
No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association
would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the
United States, by which they conceded privileges of any impor-
tance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements
on the part of the Union, might at any moment be violated by
its members.259
The Constitution, Hamilton asserted, would change all of that.260
If Madison’s Federalist 10 was the lodestar for the Beardian Con-
stitution of domestic interests, his Federalist 63 might be a good
candidate for the international Constitution. In that number, Mad-
ison put away his doubts about the Senate, with its equal represen-
tation of each state, and defended its role in treaty-making instead
of the more democratic House.261 With full participation of Congress
in treaty-making, Madison warned, “the esteem of foreign powers
will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy,
proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the national
councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the
world.”262 He went on to explain that “the judgment of other nations
258. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 26, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton).
259. Id.
260. See id. at 146.
261. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 26, at 423 (James Madison).
262. Id. at 422.
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is important to every government for two reasons.”263 The first was
that, “independently of the merits of any particular plan or mea-
sure, it is desirable on various accounts, that it should appear to
other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy.”264
Nations respected other nations that made wise decisions. The
second was that “in doubtful cases, particularly where the national
councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary
interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world,
may be the best guide that can be followed.”265
What did Madison mean by the “opinion of the impartial
world”?266 His method was to refer to ancient and modern history
and the known rules of international relations. The phrase recalled
Adam Smith’s internalized moral compass of “an impartial specta-
tor,”267 and suggested that, for Madison, lessons learned from the
past and abroad ought to be internalized in national morality. Jay
and Hamilton agreed, looking even more explicitly to the law of
nations as a guide to international decision-making.268 The authors
of The Federalist juxtaposed the traditional customs of inter-
national engagement to transient domestic politics and found in the
former truths that had been tested over time.269 Those known and
conventional rules, tried by history and supported by reason, would
offer a better guide to foreign policy than factional or even major-
itarian impulses. An opportunistic nation could gain from another
nation’s folly, taking advantage of the latter in a zero-sum transac-
tion. But there was a positive-sum alternative to this situation:
nations gained more together when each conducted itself honorably,
defined as adhering to the law of nations. “What has not America
lost by her want of character with foreign nations,” Madison asked,
“[a]nd how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if
263. Id. at 423.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 171 (1759).
268. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 26, at 13-15 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 15, supra note 26, at 92-94 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 26,
at 144 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 26, at 432-33 (John Jay).
269. See MICHAEL P. FEDERICI, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 117
(2012) (“Hamilton placed great authority in the law of nations, because it embodied the
deliberative experience of generations of human beings from different nations.”).
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the justice and propriety of her measures had in every instance been
previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear
to the unbiased part of mankind?”270 There was an “unbiased” per-
spective on national behavior available in the larger world. Real and
imagined, it was perceived as insistent in the 1780s.
III. THE FOREIGN RATIFICATION DEBATE
Although the ratification debates featured much discussion of the
United States’ international obligations—much more than histori-
ans typically note—the constitutional protection of British rights
received, unsurprisingly, less attention in the published literature.
As soon as the Convention ended, however, the British consuls read
the document and sent home excited commentaries. Federalists
then explained to British representatives what the document meant
for their interests, sometimes glossing over limitations or not cor-
recting favorable misimpressions. The large exception to their hope
was the obstacles British creditors continued to face in Virginia and,
to a lesser extent, in South Carolina and Georgia.
A. Persuading the British
Upon reading the document and talking to Federalists, the con-
suls penned breathless reports home and enclosed the printed doc-
ument—the first copies to reach Europe. “As far as I can judge,”
Phineas Bond reported from Philadelphia three days after the Con-
vention ended, “the sober and discreet Part of the Community
approve of the Plan in its present Form, & where due Consideration
is paid to the democratic Temper of the Times, it is perhaps the best
Shape in which it could have been handed forth to the People.”271
Consul George Miller observed in Charleston,
If it is approved of, and should be adopted, it promises, I think,
to rescue Congress from that Inefficient situation in which they
have long stood, as it grants sufficient powers to comply with,
270. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 26, at 423 (James Madison).
271. Letter from Phineas Bond to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Sept. 20, 1787), Foreign
Office 4/5, British National Archives.
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and enforce their Treaties and other National Engagements,
without submitting to the Controul of State Legislatures.272
By late December, Miller had “little doubt” that South Carolina
would ratify it.273 Already by October 3rd, Sir John Temple confi-
dently reported from New York that he had “no doubt” that the
Constitution would be adopted and that George Washington would
“undoubtedly” become the first President.274 All that turned out to
be correct. At those early dates, however, the perspective betrayed
itself as Federalist. Ratification proved to be a longer and more
uncertain process.275
The consuls learned much just by reading the short document. It
seemed straightforward and addressed several diplomatic con-
cerns. In case they missed anything, American guides were avail-
able and occasionally insistent. There was nothing like the printed
ratification literature, of course, addressed just to the British and
other foreign audiences. But in diplomatic conversations and cor-
respondence, Federalists told British contacts that the Constitution
changed everything about British-American relations. To this au-
dience, Federalists presented the Constitution as a package of rad-
ical reforms.
The consuls kept close tabs on the ratification debates and on the
tally of states in favor of the new document. Rumors abounded that
272. Letter from George Miller to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Nov. 17, 1787), Foreign
Office 4/5, British National Archives.
273. Letter from George Miller to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Dec. 24, 1787), Foreign Of-
fice 4/5, British National Archives. The state did so five months later. The South Carolina
Convention, Friday, 23 May 1788, in 27 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 388, 393-96.
274. Letter from John Temple to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Oct. 3, 1787), Foreign Office
4/5, British National Archives. One semi-official observer—the dyspeptic Peter Allaire, who
worked as a spy for an undersecretary of state and tried to undermine Temple and Bond in
hopes of replacing them—dissented from the positive reports. He predicted that each state
would resist being “reduced to a meer Corporation Town,” that the Confederation would
endure without reform, and in a few years the states would dissolve into a “Civil War.” Peter
Allaire, Occurrences from 5 August to 5 October 1787 (Oct. 5, 1787), Foreign Office 4/5,
British National Archives. He was alone among the local British observers in predicting that
ratification would fail, but other foreign observers agreed that the choice was between rati-
fication and dissolution. See HILL, supra note 172, at 112 (reporting a French official’s assess-
ment).
275. For an excellent overview, see generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE
DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (2010).
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North Carolina had rejected it; Virginia and New York might do
so.276 It was widely believed that Congress would have to default on
foreign loans from its allies in 1788 or 1789 if it did not get the
power to tax. It only managed to meet interest payments in 1787,
one observer reported to the Secretary of State, by taking out a new
loan from Amsterdam.277
Along with the consuls, an important conduit of information from
1788 to 1791 was Major George Beckwith. He had been a British
army intelligence officer during the American Revolution and, in
the 1790s, began ascending the higher rungs of the imperial ladder,
starting with the governorship of Bermuda, then the richer Bar-
badian governorship, and finally appointment in 1820 as the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the British military in Ireland.278 In the late
1780s, though, he was an aide to Lord Dorchester, the Governor-
General of the Canadas.279 With the Secretary of State’s approval,
Dorchester sent Beckwith several times to the United States in the
late 1780s and early 1790s as an unofficial emissary.280 Beckwith’s
official portfolio remained ambiguous. He did not, for example, pos-
sess a commission from the Privy Council but rather only a letter of
introduction from Dorchester.281 Yet, on at least one occasion, he
implied to Alexander Hamilton that Dorchester would not keep
sending him without the Cabinet’s “knowledge,” and during his later
trips, after 1790, he acted on the Secretary of State’s orders.282
276. Letter from Phineas Bond to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Sept. 2, 1788), Foreign
Office 4/6, British National Archives; Letter from Phineas Bond to the Marquess of Car-
marthen (June 28, 1788), Foreign Office 4/6, British National Archives.
277. Peter Allaire, Occurrences from 6 December to the 2d January 1788 (Jan. 3, 1788)
(enclosed in Letter from George Yonge to Marquess of Carmarthen), Foreign Office 4/6, Brit-
ish National Archives.
278. Paul David Nelson, Beckwith, Major George (1753-March 20, 1823), in 1 SPIES,
WIRETAPS, AND SECRET OPERATIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ESPIONAGE 79 (Glenn
P. Hastedt ed., 2011).
279. See id. Dorchester, when known as Sir Guy Carleton, had been Commander-in-Chief
of North America during the Revolution. See Paul David Nelson, Dorchester, Guy Carleton,
Lord (September 23, 1724-November 10, 1808), in 1 SPIES, WIRETAPS, AND SECRET OPER-
ATIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ESPIONAGE, supra note 278, at 251.
280. See DOUGLAS BRYMNER, REPORT ON CANADIAN ARCHIVES xxxvi (1891) [hereinafter
CANADIAN ARCHIVES].
281. See id.
282. See id. at xxxvi-xxxvii. At one point, during the Nootka Sound crisis, Dorchester gave
Beckwith two sets of instructions: one open and diplomatic, as an emissary from Canada, to
give him access to American officials; and another secret, instructing him to inquire about
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Always the military intelligence officer, Beckwith kept extensive
notes on his conversations, some redacted and others supposedly
verbatim. Dorchester then forwarded Beckwith’s notes to Lon-
don.283
If Major Beckwith’s primary mission was secret, his presence and
general purpose were not. Americans saw him as direct connection
to the highest levels of imperial government.284 Every time Beckwith
traveled south to the United States, cabinet members, Congress-
men, state officials, and other notables sought him out. He asked
everyone what his superiors wanted to know: Would the new gov-
ernment enforce outstanding treaty obligations? Would it ensure
that British creditors got repaid? That assurance was required be-
fore the King would send an official envoy and negotiate a commer-
cial treaty. After a few fact-finding trips, Beckwith became modestly
impressed with the new government. When visiting in mid-1788,
during the ratification campaign, he reported home that
[t]here is a general growing British interest in the states and it will
be good policy to hold a friendly language to that country, and to shew
[sic] a disposition to form a treaty of commerce with them, whenever
they shall have established a government and shewn [sic] that they
have something solid to bestow in return.285
specific topics of concern to the larger empire and directing him to report directly to West-
minster when appropriate. See, e.g., Letter from Lord Dorchester to Major Beckwith (June 27,
1790), in CANADIAN ARCHIVES, supra note 280, at 144, 144. For an American assessment of
Beckwith’s authority, see Memorandum from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington
(July 8, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 484, 484-85 (Harold C. Syrett &
Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962). Secretary of State Jefferson spoke less frequently with Beckwith
because he deemed it improper for the Secretary of State to discuss diplomacy with an
“informal agent.” Thomas Jefferson, Memorandum on Meeting with Senate Committee (Jan.
4, 1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19, 22 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1990).
283. See Letter from Lord Dorchester to Major Beckwith, supra note 282.
284. The accomplished Jefferson historian Julian P. Boyd was most likely mistaken in be-
lieving that President Washington and his cabinet had no clear sense of Beckwith’s role. His
further argument that Hamilton used the relationship to dupe Washington into believing that
Britain was eager for an alliance, and thereby made “secret attempts to control American
foreign policy,” is not persuasive. JULIAN P. BOYD, NUMBER 7: ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S SECRET
ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1964); see also Jacob E. Cooke, 81 POL.
SCI. Q. 130 (1966) (reviewing JULIAN P. BOYD, NUMBER 7: ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S SECRET
ATTEMPT TO CONTROL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1964)). Still, Boyd’s outraged tone captures
something important about Beckwith’s missions: indirect diplomacy was the only diplomacy
Britain was willing to offer in the first two years of the Washington Administration.
285. George Beckwith, Opinions and Observations of Different Persons Respecting the
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He nicely observed that the Constitution had persuaded “the most
enlightened” of the loyalists to become Federalists, reconciling
themselves to the fact “that the re-union of the empire is impracti-
cable.”286 But note his judgment that, after ratification and before
elections, there was still no government, and also that waning hos-
tility and the emergence of a group favorable to Britain were not
sufficient reasons for a new treaty.287
The Constitution was a positive sign, but much remained to be
done. An open question was the time period over which the new
government should be judged. Shrewdly, though perhaps too pes-
simistically, Beckwith noted that “sensible federalists view the new
system as a work for their posterity” and “doubt[ed] whether any of
its advantages w[ould] be felt in their time.”288 Revenue was the
largest problem. The new government had to “collect[ ] taxes and
prevent[ ] smuggling,” which frustrated customs collection.289 These
efforts faced popular resistance. To account for the Confederation’s
“disordered” finances, Beckwith reported that “the root of the evil”
lay in the states and their “successive violations of the public faith
and credit, the injudicious circulation of paper money, its various
depreciations,” and statutes “undeniably calculated to serve indi-
viduals at the general expence.”290 Consequently, “it must be a work
both of time and great good sense to give credit and dignity to their
Government.”291
The United States also needed a military. The existing army was
insufficient even to keep peace on “the Indian frontiers.”292 After
noticing the American grievance that the British military was still
occupying several western forts, and that the army could not subdue
the Native American nations there who resisted U.S. sovereignty,
Beckwith suggested to Hamilton that Britain participate with the
United States, in CANADIAN ARCHIVES, supra note 280, at 100, 103 (enclosed in Letter from
Lord Dorchester to Lord Sydney (Oct. 14, 1788)).
286. Id. at 102. Though many Loyalists of “the lower order are violent antifederalists,”
Beckwith reported, and he hoped that if constitutional reform failed, the states would rejoin
the empire. Id.
287. See id. at 102-04.
288. Id. at 102.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 105.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 102.
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United States in peacemaking efforts with the Ohio Valley na-
tions.293 The offer probably stemmed from British qualms about
ceding western land without even explaining the cession to allied
Native American nations as well as from a desire to protect British
fur trading interests.294 It was an early example of a proposal that
Britain later made for a buffer zone of relative Native American
autonomy.295 Hamilton rebuffed this proposal, as Americans would
all the others. It was “consistent with our system to terminate
Indian differences by accommodation,” Hamilton told Beckwith, at
least after operations had moved along so far.296 One reason it was
too late was because white settlers in the Ohio Valley would not
accept peace: “[W]e could not put a negative upon this business
without disobliging our Western people.”297 Beckwith appeared to
understand the rejection, and he did not suggest that the Native
nations should be accorded full sovereignty. When, two years later,
an envoy suggested British mediation and even a “barrier,” Ham-
ilton remained firmly opposed and 
resisted [the] insinuation of the good effect that would arise from
requesting the Kings mediation, by stating that a part of the
Indians, now engaged in war with the United States, lived
within their territory and were considered in some measure as
their subjects, and that upon that ground no external interven-
tion could be allowed.298
In addition, a three-way negotiation “would degrade the United
States in the estimation of the Indians, and sow the seeds of future
293. Conversation with George Beckwith and William Macomb (Jan. 31, 1791), in 7 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 608-13 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1963).
294. For British diplomatic motivations in the Ohio Valley, see ALAN TAYLOR, DIVIDED
GROUND: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE NORTHERN BORDERLAND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 111-19 (2006).
295. See Conversation with George Beckwith (Oct. 15-20, 1790), in 7 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 293, at 111, 112.
296. Id. at 112-13.
297. Id.
298. Conversation with George Hammond (Dec. 15-16, 1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 373, 375 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1966) (quoting
Letter from George Hammond to Lord Grenville (June 8, 1792), Foreign Office 4/15, British
National Archives); see also LEONARD J. SADOSKY, REVOLUTIONARY NEGOTIATIONS: INDIANS,
EMPIRES, AND DIPLOMATS IN THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (2010) (exploring United States
diplomacy with the Native American nations in early America).
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dissension, as the latter would be tempted to aggression by the
expectation of a similar interference on any other occasion.”299 In
other words, the United States needed recognition from the Native
American nations too, and Britain was crucial to that process too.
The British seemed to accept this answer, though they continued
offering mediation. However benevolent the intent, these proposals
were received as assaults on full American sovereignty: a civilized
state, Hamilton insisted, had at least supervisory power over the
indigenous people within its territory. European diplomats under-
stood that position. In addition, Hamilton assumed that the Native
Americans were familiar with that principle too and would not
respect the United States should it forego that prerogative.
An even larger issue was treaty obligations. For Beckwith, the
issue was whether Americans would follow the steps necessary to
make the Constitution succeed. “[I]t remains yet to be decided,” he
wrote to Lord Dorchester just weeks before elections for the new
Congress, “whether the people of the states at large are in a
disposition to submit to measures unavoidably requisite, if they are
to be a nation, connected with foreign powers, either, by political or
commercial treaties.”300 Would the American people use the Con-
stitution to become a nation, able to undertake relations with other
nations? During his return visits, Beckwith tried to answer his own
question.
“[T]he real views of communities, as well as of individuals,” he
told Hamilton in 1789, “are rather to be gathered from their conduct
than from their professions.”301 To prove that the treaty would be
enforced, his American informants emphasized the role of the Con-
stitution’s Supremacy Clause and the federal judiciary. Hamilton
was Beckwith’s most frequent interlocutor. “We have lately estab-
lished a Government upon principles,” he assured the emissary,
“that in my opinion render it safe for any nation to enter into Trea-
ties with us, either Commercial or Political, which has not hitherto
been the case.”302 He had written similarly in the Federalist Papers
299. Conversation with George Hammond (Dec. 15-16, 1791), supra note 298, at 375-76.
300. Beckwith, supra note 285, at 102 (emphasis added).
301. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Lord Grenville (Oct. 25, 1789), in CANADIAN ARCHIVES,
supra note 280, at 121, 126 (enclosing communications with different persons).
302. Id. at 125.
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in late 1787.303 Over the next few years, he kept repeating it to Brit-
ish diplomats. The Constitution “has declared Treaties with Foreign
powers to be the law of the land,” Hamilton told Beckwith in 1790,
“the Judges in general are men whose opinions on this subject are
perfectly well ascertained, and nothing but an insurrection in
opposition to their decisions can in future prevent the regular and
usual course of justice.”304 Similarly, the paper tender laws, which
allowed debtors to pay creditors in depreciated currency, were “done
away with by the present Government, which has paid the most
particular attention to this in the formation and establishment of its
Judiciary branch; the District Courts will be in immediate opera-
tion; the supreme court very shortly.”305 In sum, Hamilton explained
to Beckwith that a leading purpose for the constitutional prohibi-
tions on state power in Article I, Section 10, as well for creating a
federal judiciary, was to ensure that American debtors repaid their
foreign creditors in full.
Senator William Samuel Johnson also focused Beckwith’s at-
tention on the courts. Johnson (1727-1819) sat on the Connecticut
Superior Court in the late colonial period, and on the eve of the
Revolution he traveled to London as the colony’s agent.306 He had
remained loyal during the war and was arrested for communicating
with the enemy when he pleaded for peace with British Comman-
der-in-Chief Thomas Gage.307 Reintegrating smoothly after the war,
Johnson served as a Connecticut delegate to the Confederation
Congress beginning in 1784,308 to the Constitutional Convention in
1787,309 and then as the state’s federal senator from 1789-1791.310
Following in the footsteps of his father, the more famous and active
loyalist Samuel Johnson, he was president of Columbia College from
303. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 26, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton).
304. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville (Nov. 20, 1790), in CANADIAN ARCHIVES,
supra note 280, at 163, 165 (enclosing communications from different persons).
305. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Lord Grenville, supra note 301, at 127.
306. Elizabeth P. McCaughey, William Samuel Johnson, The Loyal Whig, in THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES 69, 75-83 (William M. Fowler, Jr. & Wallace Coyle
eds., 1979).
307. See E. EDWARDS BEARDSLEY, LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D.
112-17 (1876).
308. Id. at 120.
309. Id. at 126.
310. See id. at 133, 138.
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1787 to 1800.311 William’s son and fellow loyalist attended the Inns
of Court during the Revolution, and then pursued patronage to
serve in the remaining British American colonies.312 Senator John-
son drew on his old connections with British officials to request
assistance in obtaining a place for his son on the Bermuda Council
in 1790.313 Although the application ultimately failed, the Consul-
General Temple in New York vouched that Johnson had been
“constantly attached to his Majesty & to his Government” during
the war, “had a great share in framing the New Constitution and
would probably be sent Minister to London if the states were not
fearful of his being too much attached to the Interests & Govern-
ment of G. Britain.”314
At the same time that he sought patronage for his son, Johnson
tried to persuade Beckwith that the new Constitution marked a
dramatic change in Anglo-American relations, one that should com-
pel Britain’s government to send an accredited diplomat to the new
republic.315 He promised Beckwith in 1790 that the new federal
judiciary would give British creditors “the most perfect satisfaction
in their proceedings,” although the impoverishment of many debt-
ors remained a practical obstacle to collection.316 Johnson added that
it is remarkable that the present Chief Justice (Mr. John Jay)
was the Minister for foreign affairs, who reported the various
infractions of the Treaty of Peace, by the State Legislatures, and
is it possible to suppose, that what he openly acknowledged in
his political character, will not equally affect his decisions on the
Bench ...?317
311. Id. at 129, 163.
312. See Letter from John Temple to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Oct. 2, 1788), Foreign
Office 4/6, British National Archives.
313. See id.
314. Id.
315. See Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville (May 27, 1790), in CANADIAN AR-
CHIVES, supra note 280, at 133, 135, 138.
316. Id. at 137.
317. Id.; see also Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville, supra note 304, at 165
(communicating Secretary of the Northwest Territory Winthrop Sargent’s report that “our
Judiciary has declared Treaties with Foreign powers to be the law of the land; the Judges in
general are men whose opinions on this subject are perfectly well ascertained, and nothing
but an insurrection in opposition to their decisions can in future prevent the regular and
usual course of justice”). For Johnson’s and Sargent’s identities as the sources quoted in these
letters, see CANADIAN ARCHIVES, supra note 280, at xli-xlii; see also BOYD, supra note 284, 33
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Other senators developed the theme that the courts would do
justice to British creditors. Amidst the second session of the first
Congress, New Jersey Senator (and future Supreme Court Justice)
William Paterson reported to Beckwith that American debtors fully
realized that the new judiciary would hear claims based on the
Treaty of Peace.319 Indeed, in the states south of Maryland, “the ex-
pected operation of the federal Courts has given the most serious
alarms” because “in these States the Merchants and Planters are
greatly indebted to the Merchants of England, and to be sure for
years past a Spirit of Government has been manifested equally
dishonest and unjust.”320 The Southerners realized that, under the
new federal government, “this must now cease.”321 Other observers
were more cautious. Consul George Miller in Charleston was dis-
appointed that the southern legislatures continued to pass debt-
relief legislation, which left him “not so sanguine” about the effect
of the new federal government.322 Still, he could not “help expressing
his hopes, that the Federal Courts of Justice will pay little or no
regard to many of them [that is, debtor relief laws].”323
These promises about the federal courts became even more
plausible after the passage of the Judiciary Act in late September of
n.67.
318. See Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville, supra note 315, at 135, 138. 
319. See id. at 139.
320. Id.
321. Id. Paterson told Beckwith that the state governments in the South were more “demo-
cratic” than those in the North, 
where the science of Government is better understood. 
Mr. Jefferson is a proof of this, he is a man of some acquirements, extending
even to elegant literature, but his opinions upon Government are the result of
fine spun theoretic systems, drawn from the ingenious writings of Locke, Sydney
and others of their cast, which can never be realized[;] such opinions very prob-
ably are the favorite ones with those who now conduct the revolution in France.
Id. at 139-40.
322. George Miller, Report upon the Following Points, in Obedience to the Command of his
Grace the Duke of Leeds, His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Jan.
28, 1790), Foreign Office 4/8, British National Archives. Francis Godolphin Obsborne, the
Marquess of Carmarthen, succeeded his father as the Duke of Leeds in 1789 and remained
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until mid-1791. G.F. Russell Barker, Osborne, Francis,
Fifth Duke of Leeds (1751-1799), in 42 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY at 286 (Sidney
Lee ed., 1895).
323. Miller, supra note 322.
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1789. British observers read the statute closely. The day before the
President signed the bill into law, Consul-General Temple, who had
read the statute, exclaimed in a letter to the Foreign Secretary that
the Definitive Treaty is now acknowledged to be the Law of the
Land, and every thing contrary to that Treaty is, by Congress,
repealed in the several states, if therefore any British subject
meets with injustice in the recovery of his debts from the sub-
jects of these states, or of the lawful interest due upon the same,
he may have justice done him by applying to the Federal Courts
now Established agreeably to the Constitution.324
To him, the creation of federal courts promised the enforcement of
the treaty.
The Judiciary Act deserved more careful analysis than Temple
gave it. He assumed that this jurisdictional statute automatically
executed the Supremacy Clause and the specific prohibitions on
state legislation in Article I, Section 10. Creditors still needed to
bring judicial cases to work out whether those state laws actually
did impose forbidden “impediment[s].”325 Temple also did not men-
tion the absence of original federal question jurisdiction, which in-
cluded cases arising under treaties, or the jurisdictional minimum
for alienage cases ($500).326 However, he rightly emphasized that
the courts offered a new enforcement mechanism to vindicate Brit-
ish rights.327
Early in 1790, Temple exultantly reported that “[t]he Supreme
Federal Court opened in this City yesterday, in which Court it is to
be supposed every foreigner may now obtain Justice.”328 A reinte-
grated loyalist sent the same news to the British Secretary of
State’s office on the same day, adding that the event proved that
“we [are] now in Every Respect—A Nation.”329 Many federal courts,
324. Letter from John Temple to the Duke of Leeds (Sept. 23, 1789), Foreign Office 4/7,
British National Archives. The Judiciary Act was enacted on September 24, 1789. Judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
325. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 55, at 82-83.
326. See Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 11-12, 1 Stat. 73, 78-80.
327. See Letter from John Temple to the Duke of Leeds, supra note 324.
328. Letter from John Temple to the Duke of Leeds (Feb. 4, 1790), Foreign Office 4/8,
British National Archives.
329. Letter from Peter Allaire to George Yonge (Feb. 4, 1790), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1800, at 688, 688 (Maeva
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especially in the North, immediately began to set aside state law
conflicting with treaty rights.330 For example, a federal circuit court
in Connecticut held that a statute abating interest during the war
violated the Treaty of Peace and was void.331 The circuit court
included Chief Justice John Jay and Justice William Cushing, along
with District Judge Richard Law.332 Interest during the war, which
at 5 percent for eight years made up a substantial fraction of the
outstanding debts,333 was a major point of controversy between
debtors and creditors.334 Federalists exulted. “Died last Thursday,”
read a mock obituary.335 “It received its death wound by the
adoption of the New Constitution” and “the two-edged sword of
justice; gave its last fatal stroke, and it expired without a groan.”336
This account was republished in several states337 and seems to have
landed on Phineas Bond’s desk in Philadelphia.338 He excitedly
reported to London that, according to the federal judges, “whatever
might have been the Situation of the Contract, during the War, it
was revived by the Peace; not partially, but in its full Extent,”
including interest: “[T]here was a moral obligation to pay it, with
the principal, whenever the public Tranquillity was restored.”339
The Constitution did more than protect rights, meaning in British
eyes international rights, of course. It also empowered the new
Congress to make commercial policy without interference from the
states.340 Inconsistent and conflicting policies among the states, and
Marcus et al. eds., 1985). He added that the proliferation of courts—local, state, federal—
made it a “fine [ti]me for the Lawyers.” Id. (alteration in original).
330. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, 1790-1794, at 122-23 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1988).
331. Id. at 123.
332. Id.
333. See Sheridan, supra note 47, at 166 n.19, 167.
334. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, supra note 330, at 123.
335. By Last Evening’s MAILS, Connecticut, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Boston), May 11, 1791,
at 66.
336. Id.
337. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, supra note 330, at 123 n.6.
338. See Letter from Phineas Bond to Lord Grenville (Dec. 6, 1791), Foreign Office 4/11,
British National Archives.
339. Id.; see also Letter from MacDonogh to Leeds (May 11, 1791), Foreign Office 4/10,
British National Archives (reporting the same case).
340. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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between them and Congress, had bedeviled commercial negotiations
throughout the 1780s.341 Some states used import duties to raise
revenue, penalize Britain, or both.342 In a textbook example of inter-
jurisdictional competition, others posted low rates, trying to lure
trade away from their high-taxing neighbors.343 This crazy quilt of
trade regulations was one reason why the British refused to enter
negotiations for a commercial treaty.344 By contrast, French dip-
lomats had not been displeased by inconsistent trade laws, hoping
that their slow-moving merchants would eventually capitalize on
state discrimination against British trade.345 Now Congress alone
had the power to regulate international commerce. It threatened to
use it to retaliate against Britain for refusing to grant American
ships access to the West Indian trade.346 In the first Congress, Mad-
ison proposed two forms of retaliation. The first was to raise the im-
port and tonnage duties on British goods and ships above those paid
by other European traders.347 The second was to prohibit British
ships trading with the West Indies from docking in the United
States for resupply.348 In other words, British traders would not be
able to use American ports as way stations to and from the Carib-
bean.349
These discriminatory proposals failed to pass the Federalist-
dominated Senate350 but got the attention of British merchants and
341. See infra Part II.B.
342. See HILL, supra note 172, at 63.
343. Connecticut, for example, lowered its tariffs and loosened antiloyalist laws to attract
loyalists and British subjects from neighboring New York. See Oscar Zeichner, The Re-
habilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut, 11 NEW ENGLAND Q. 308 (1938).
344. See infra Part II.B.
345. HILL, supra note 172, at 63.
346. See Drew R. McCoy, Republicanism and American Foreign Policy: James Madison and
the Political Economy of Commercial Discrimination, 1789 to 1794, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 633,
634-35 (1974).
347. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 260-61 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al.
eds., 1992).
348. See id. Madison had supported discrimination since the mid-1780s, and it marked
Republican foreign policy up until 1812. See generally McCoy, supra note 346; Drew R. McCoy,
The Virginia Port Bill of 1784, 83 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 288 (1975).
349. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, supra note 347, at 260-61.
350. See 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 1950-51 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen
E. Veit eds., 1986).
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their government.351 If nothing else, the proposals demonstrated
that Congress now controlled commercial policy. Britons were
amazed that Americans believed that commercial threats would
work.352 If the United States wished to gain privileges from Britain,
it had to negotiate in good faith, not make threats.353 As Lord
Dorchester’s secretary put it, “The idea of seeking commercial
friendship by commercial hostilities, the apprehension of Great
Britain monopolizing the commerce of the world and the comparison
of it to a great whale swallowing up the ocean, are equally whimsi-
cal and preposterous.”354 Britons responded in two ways. One was to
seek accommodation. Despite what he saw as flawed American
reasoning—or perhaps because it was so flawed—Dorchester’s
secretary counseled “moderation” toward the United States, attri-
buting such illogic to commercial frustration.355 The American
threat indicated that it was “high time” to settle all the outstanding
grievances stemming from the Treaty of Peace.356
Others, however, were less accommodating. If Americans dis-
criminated against Britain, Britain should reciprocate.357 It would
start by simply placing American trade with Britain on the same
footing as all other foreign trade.358 Eight years after the Treaty of
Peace, the United States still enjoyed privileges in Britain that no
other nation did.359 High on the list was the exemption of American
merchants from paying the Alien Duty when unloading goods in
British ports, an unintended benefit of the British government’s
unwillingness to rethink its trade relationship with the new nation
from the ground up.360 Americans were excluded from intra-imperial
commerce, especially the rich West Indian trade.361 Nonetheless,
351. See Letter from Lord Dorchester to Lord Grenville, supra note 301, at 127-28.
352. See id. at 127.
353. See id.
354. Letter from Henry Motz to Lieutenant Colonel Beckwith (May 6, 1791), in CANADIAN
ARCHIVES, supra note 280, at 169, 170; see also Letter from Lord Dorchester to Lord Grenville,
supra note 301, at 127-28.
355. Letter from Henry Motz to Lieutenant Colonel Beckwith, supra note 354, at 170.
356. Id.
357. See REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF THE LORDS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL ON THE TRADE OF
GREAT BRITAIN WITH THE UNITED STATES 38-43 (1791) [hereinafter REPORT].
358. See id. at 34.
359. See id. at 8, 32.
360. See id. at 8, 40.
361. See id. at 42, 45.
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they enjoyed some odd holdovers from the colonial period.362 For
example, customs officers in London continued to treat all mer-
chants from North America, including those from the United States,
as subjects, as under pre-revolutionary customs statutes.363
Hamilton, who had become the first Federal Treasury Secretary,
realized that American merchants enjoyed “certain indulgencies” in
Britain and understood that, if Congress passed discriminatory
legislation, Britain could justifiably take away these privileges and
“place us precisely on the footing of all other foreign powers.”364
Although he had championed the cause of congressional commercial
power during the ratification campaign because it would give the
United States the power to threaten Britain, Hamilton was re-
luctant to use that power. It was an early example of a persistent
theme in the Washington Administration. No cabinet member sup-
ported building national capacity and defense more than Hamilton.
Yet time and again he warned of the dangers of using that power
recklessly. Consistently from the Revolution until his death he ar-
gued that some degree of power was necessary to be taken seriously
by other nations. Once attained, however, power should remain in
reserve, while pursuing negotiations and seeking compromise.365 It
was the same advice he gave his private legal clients: litigation was
often not worth the cost and uncertainty.366 So too his public coun-
sel. He preferred the United States to appear as a hawk and man-
euver like a dove. Prominent opponents favored the reverse.
362. See id. at 8, 32.
363. See id. at 32.
364. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Lord Grenville, supra note 301, at 128.
365. Hamilton’s threshold for deploying power domestically was much lower, as demon-
strated in his reactions to tax rebellions in Pennsylvania. See THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE
WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 119 (1986).
366. For an example of Hamilton’s advice to a private client to seek accommodation rather
than continue to litigation, see Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 19,
1792), in 11 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 317 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1966) (recalling a famous Trespass Act case that ended in a “voluntary compromise” that
Hamilton supported). For Hamilton’s advice in that case, see Memorial of Benjamin Wad-
dington & Co. Late of the City of New York in North America, British Merchants & Subjects,
Respecting Prosecutions Carried on Against Joshua Waddington Their Late Servant Under
a Law Called the Trespass Act Passed by the Legislature of That State Since the Peace, & Di-
rectly in the Face of the Treaty (Aug. 20, 1786), Foreign Office 4/4, British National Archives
(advising defendant to compromise “because the Law was express and the Juries, independent
of Party prejudices, were all interested in a similar manner with Rutgers the Plaintiff ”).
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A New York City merchant named Telfair, who identified as a
British subject, offered Beckwith the perspective of Wall Street.367
He paid close attention to congressional debates over commercial
policy, in particular Madison’s proposal to discriminate against Brit-
ish trade. On the one hand, Telfair thought that the new nation was
not capable of retaliation, “whatever Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Maddison
[sic] and that party may insinuate to the contrary.”368 The new gov-
ernment depended on customs revenue.369 Because the government
could not tax much in other ways, cutting off British trade would
impoverish it.370 Telfair was nonetheless concerned. He admitted
that trade discrimination was a valid exercise of national power, not
an act of belligerency.371 Still, it could cascade into a series of anta-
gonistic measures.372 In the small world of American commerce and
politics, Telfair had talked directly to Madison.373 This was the
spring of 1790, as Spain and Britain rattled swords in the Nootka
Sound over jurisdiction to the Pacific Northwest.374 If Britain and
Spain went to war, the latter might invoke a treaty commitment
and request that France fight as well.375 In turn, if France construed
the war as defensive, it could request that the United States join as
well in defense of its Caribbean colonies, as required by the Franco-
American Treaty of Alliance (1778).376 In what turned out to be a dry
run for the wars of the French Revolution, all hoped that France
would not make the fateful request.377 Spain effectively capitulated
and settled the matter peaceably, along the way teaching the
Americans a lesson in how to negotiate with that kingdom.378 Still,
367. Wall Street had become associated with securities trading at least by 1792. See
WALTER WERNER & STEVEN T. SMITH, WALL STREET 22-23 (1991) (recounting the estab-
lishment of a stock exchange partnership on Wall Street in early 1792).
368. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville, supra note 315, at 140.
369. See id. at 140-41.
370. See id.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 140.
374. On the Nootka Sound Dispute, see Lennox Mills, The Real Significance of the Nootka
Sound Incident, 6 CANADIAN HIST. REV. 110 (1925).
375. See id. at 112-13.
376. Treaty of Alliance, Fr.-U.S., art. 11, Feb. 6, 1778 (requiring the United States to “guar-
antee ... the present Possessions of the Crown of france in America as well as those which it
may acquire by the future Treaty of peace”).
377. See Mills, supra note 374, at 112-13.
378. See id. at 113.
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Madison told Telfair that in the event of a Franco-British war, he
would propose preventing British ships from refitting in American
ports while “assist[ing] the fleets of France ... in every respect.”379
Telfair replied that “such behaviour by the law of Nations would be
construed as actual hostility,”380 which was a fair opinion, one that
President Washington’s cabinet embraced unanimously three years
later in the Neutrality Controversy.381 Even merchants were school-
ed enough in the law of nations to know the effect of what was
termed “imperfect neutrality” between warring nations.382 Madison’s
proposal demonstrated that Congress knew it had power and was
willing to use it.383 Whether bad policy, fiscally ruinous, or a step
down a slippery slope, these proposed measures got Britain’s
attention.
Another informant was Daniel McCormick, an Irish merchant
who immigrated to New York in the 1760s, remained loyal during
the Revolution, and afterward picked up where he left off, brokering
deals between American and British merchants.384 By 1790 he
identified himself as an American citizen but remained essentially
a British-American merchant who invested heavily in United States
securities and land, and he sold both to British investors.385 McCor-
mick’s conversation with Beckwith was all business.386 What he
added was a transatlantic merchant’s sensitivity to the changing
379. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville, supra note 315, at 140.
380. Id.
381. See Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASH-
INGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 472-73 (Philander D. Chase et al. eds., 2005).
382. See Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville, supra note 315, at 140.
383. See id.
384. McCormick did not bear arms and was not attainted during the Revolution, but he
remained behind British lines and served as an auctioneer of American prizes captured by
British privateers operating out of New York City. Soon after the war, he, like many loyalists,
became acquainted with Hamilton and for twenty years served (with a few other loyalists) on
the board of directors of the Bank of New York. See 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 131 nn.7-8 (Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds., 1980). He was one of several
Irish merchants such as William Constable and William Edgar who navigated between both
sides of the Revolution and emerged better off than before. See id. On the cadre of Irish
merchants in New York, who for two generations played all sides of most imperial conflicts,
see generally THOMAS M. TRUXES, DEFYING EMPIRE: TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK (2008).
385. See 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 384, at 131, 141, 236,
254 n.40, 260, 266 n.21.
386. See Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Grenville, supra note 315, at 140.
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political environment. A few years earlier (this was the spring of
1790), British merchants had decreased their trade with America
because they could not obtain payment in sterling.387 The specie
imbalance forced Americans to undertake some manufacturing and
to increase their exports, particularly of wheat, which brought back
hard money.388 Now that specie was again flowing, British mer-
chants returned to American markets.389 They had even begun “to
speculate largely in our Continental floating paper of various kinds,
from their opinion of our present Government and from the then low
value of those securities.”390 The bottom line was that British
investors were betting on the health of the new federal government.
It nonetheless remained a sensitive market. McCormick noted that
American bond prices had recently “fallen somewhat from the de-
lays in our funding system, and in particular from the debates in
our house of representatives respecting the assumption or non-
assumption of our State Debts.”391 Besides informing Beckwith of
the bond market’s reaction to a healthier economy and to the new
federal government, McCormick revealed just how closely investors
followed the vicissitudes of American politics. What are recorded
now as political landmarks—the establishment of the federal gov-
ernment, the passage of the Judiciary Act, discrimination bills that
passed one house but failed in the other, the assumption of state
debt, and the charter for the Bank of the United States—were then
breaking news for transatlantic merchants, figured into business
calculations, and affected the nation’s reintegration into the Atlantic
economy.
While promising that the federal courts would enforce the treaty,
Hamilton kept nudging the secret emissary toward the “reciprocal
appointment of Ministers.”392 The United States did not want to
send a minister first again, as in 1785. Why had Britain not sent
387. See id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. Foreign investors were engaged in the reverse of Beardian behavior: they invested
in government securities after the ratification of the Constitution, not before.
391. Id. Bond prices recovered and then rose in the mid-late 1790s, when all the pieces of
Hamilton’s funding system came together. See Richard Sylla, Financial Foundations: Public
Credit, the National Bank, and Securities Markets, in FOUNDING CHOICES, supra note 133, at
59.
392. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. Greenville, supra note 315, at 135.
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one then? “I replied,” Beckwith told Dorchester, “that the condition
of the States at that time had been such, as to have rendered it
impracticable for a Minister from us to have remained at New York,
and if otherwise, from the nature of their then Government he could
have been of no service.”393 The political situation had changed. The
request became insistent. “Will you send us a Minister?” Hamilton
pleaded.394 “[P]erhaps we shall not wish to send [one] a second time
without assurances of this nature, or your taking a lead in it.”395
Then he invoked the American people: “[I]t would be a popular mea-
sure and tend greatly to set everything in motion in a good hu-
moured way.”396 Formal representation would not only be good for
diplomacy but also good for domestic politics, which in turn affected
the diplomatic environment. In a republic, good optics served dip-
lomacy.
Only a commissioned envoy could negotiate a commercial agree-
ment. For Americans the wait seemed interminable. But Spain had
not fully recognized the United Provinces of the Netherlands for
eighty years after the provincial revolt of the 1560s.397 In the end,
the United States waited only eight years.
B. The Board of Trade Reviews the Constitution
In 1790, while considering whether to send a minister plenipo-
tentiary to the United States, and to assist in drafting instructions,
Britain’s Privy Council asked the Board of Trade to analyze the
state of government and commerce in the United States.398 The
393. Id.; see also id. at 136 (“[W]e have had a Minister at your Court [referring to John
Adams in the mid-1780s], you did not send one in return, we should find a difficulty in taking
the lead again in such a nomination.”). Julian Boyd argued that the Canadian Archives
mislabeled the conversations on pages 134-36, transcribing as Number 1 what was actually
Number 7: namely, Hamilton. BOYD, supra note 284, at 33 n.67. Following Boyd, the attri-
bution here is to Hamilton.
394. Letter from Lord Dorchester to Lord Grenville, supra note 315, at 138.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Spain recognized the independence of the Netherlands in the Peace of Munster (1648),
which ended the Eighty Years War. See Laura Manzano Baena, Negotiating Sovereignty: The
Peace Treaty of Münster, 1648, 28 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 617 (2007).
398. The Privy Council was the ancient royal advisory council that was then being sup-
planted by its subcommittee known as the cabinet. See generally ALBERT VENN DICEY, THE
PRIVY COUNCIL 130-45 (repr. ed. 1979) (1860). On the operation of the Board of Trade in the
1304 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1239
Board spent months collecting and digesting information before
reporting in January 1791.399 It sifted through mounds of consular
correspondence, Phineas Bond’s trade statistics, merchant memori-
als, and other sources.400 It also queried merchant interest groups
from the key ports of London, Bristol, Liverpool, and Glasgow.401
The report’s prime architect was Lord Hawkesbury, who served as
President of the Board of Trade for almost twenty years, viewed
trade as a zero-sum game that Britain should dominate, and was
disinclined to make exceptions for former colonists enjoying a peace
treaty he had opposed.402 Yet the main message of the report was
the admission that this debate could no longer be framed in terms
of Britain’s discretionary choice.403 The organizing fact within that
report was the new Constitution and establishment of the federal
government under it.404 Harsh and grudging as it was, the report
effectively ended Tory fantasies that Britain would someday recover
its old North American provinces.
The report discloses more clearly than any other source that the
establishment of the federal government under the new Consti-
tution was the proximate cause for sending an official envoy to the
United States and commencing trade negotiations. If one bottom
line was not much different from Lord Sheffield’s eight years
earlier—the United States still needed British commerce more than
the reverse—another was that it was time to open formal diplomatic
relations with the new government.405 The report concluded that the
Constitution gave the federal government the power to resolve
outstanding grievances under the treaty as well as the power to
eighteenth century, see Alison G. Olson, The Board of Trade and London-American Interest
Groups in the Eighteenth Century, 8 J. IMPERIAL & COMMONWEALTH HIST. 33 (1980). The
Rockingham Whigs abolished the 160-year-old Board of Trade at the end of the Revolution;
William Pitt reconstituted it two years later.
399. Privy Council Committee on Trade, Report on Two Acts Passed by the Congress of the
United States of America to the Privy (Jan. 28, 1791), Foreign Office 4/9, British National
Archives, later printed as REPORT, supra note 357.
400. See id.
401. See id. at 4.
402. On Charles Jenkinson, Lord Hawkesbury (later the first Earl of Liverpool), and his
role on the Board of Trade in the 1780s and 1790s, see 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE 144 (John Holland Rose et al. eds., 1940).
403. See REPORT, supra note 357, at 99-100.
404. See id. at 6.
405. See id. at 99-101.
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discriminate against British trade, and was considering doing so.406
In sum, the new government appeared capable of fulfilling its duties
and also exercising its sovereign rights under the law of nations.
The report began by stating that although Britain had “acknow-
ledg[ed]” the independence of the states in 1783 and had from that
date excluded American ships from colonial trade, it had not yet
developed “new principles, on which a new system of commerce
might be founded.”407 The post-Revolutionary states had made such
a system impossible because they “were governed in all commercial
matters by separate and distinct Legislatures, which were [all]
independent of each other, and had different interests to pursue.”408
Instead, Parliament had granted the Privy Council authority each
year to make “provisional regulations” to govern British-American
trade.409 But the states now had agreed to “a new Constitution” that
vested the power to regulate commerce in a “general government,”
and they should “now ... be considered as One Body Politic.”410 As
the Board noted when commenting on Madison’s proposals to dis-
criminate against British imports, “The United States are now an
Independent Nation.”411
The Board blamed the states for two obstacles that had prevent-
ed the development of a formal commercial policy. First, the
individual states had passed inconsistent trade laws.412 The result
was a patchwork of state laws so various and mutable that it was
“hardly possible to obtain a complete account of them.”413 There
were echoes here of Madison’s criticism of the mutability and
multiplicity of state legislation four years earlier in his memo on the
vices of the political system of the states.414 The bottom line from the
available information was that some states had discriminated
against British goods and shipping by charging higher impost and
tonnage fees compared not only to American goods and ships but
406. See supra notes 346-56 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s threat to
discriminate against British trade and some British reactions).
407. REPORT, supra note 357, at 6.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 70. 
412. Id. at 15.
413. Id.
414. See generally Madison, supra note 147.
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also to those imposed on commerce from other European empires.415
Second, many state laws blocked British creditors from collecting
debts in violation of the peace treaty.416 The Board concluded that
these laws constituted a valid grievance that had to be resolved be-
fore beginning commercial negotiations.417 Cancelling “mercantile
contracts, or other private and personal obligations” during war was
“unjust.”418 The Board implicitly drew on the emerging norm in the
law of nations that belligerent powers should not, perhaps could
not, interfere with private contracts, especially executory debt
contracts, between their respective subjects. In addition, the United
States had agreed in Article IV of the Treaty of Peace that creditors
on either side would face “no lawful impediment to the recovery of
the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore
contracted.”419 Violating this pledge, the states had imposed many
impediments, which the Board described with detail derived from
the consuls’ letters and creditors’ petitions.420 In outline form, the
summary of these “lawful impediments” included:
1. Installment laws that postponed repayment “to a very distant
period”;421
415. See REPORT, supra note 357, at 15.
416. See id. at 15-16.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 16.
419. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 55, at 82.
420. In 1789, the Board sent a list of questions to the Secretary of State, who forwarded
them to the American consuls. Bond, at least, responded with a key that led back to his letters
over the previous few years. Letter from Board of Trade to the Duke of Leeds (June 30, 1789),
Foreign Office 4/7, British National Archives; Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke of Leeds
(Nov. 10, 1789), Foreign Office 4/7, British National Archives. The Board cited Phineas Bond’s
charts of trading and tonnage volume but did not cite particular letters. See REPORT, supra
note 357, at 44-54. However, there was nowhere else to gain some of the information. For
example, the precise description of a colloquy between Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas
McKean and a Federalist juror, who asked whether it was proper under the treaty, as
McKean had charged the jury, to deduct interest on a British debt for the period of the war,
REPORT, supra note 357, at 18, could have come only from Bond’s account of this unreported
case, which was appended to a letter in 1789, Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke of Leeds,
supra.
421. REPORT, supra note 357, at 17. Many sources informed the Secretary of State’s office
about the installment laws, for example: Letter from the Memorial of the Committee of Mer-
chants Trading to North America to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Feb. 19, 1789), Foreign Of-
fice 4/7, British National Archives (South Carolina); Letter from George Miller to Marquess
of Carmarthen (Nov. 30, 1788), Foreign Office 4/6, British National Archives (South Carolina);
Letter from Peter Allaire to Sir George Yonge (June 6, 1787), Foreign Office 4/5, British
National Archives (Maryland).
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2. Prohibition laws that forbade creditors from bringing suit to
collect debts, also “till a distant period”;422
3. Statutes that delayed execution of judgments in favor of cred-
itors;423 
4. Statutes that allowed debtors to repay their creditors in “de-
preciated paper-currency”;424
5. Statutes that allowed debtors to repay their creditors in land,
valued at inflated prices, even though state courts held that
British creditors were aliens and therefore, according to the com-
mon law, could not hold lands, which meant that the land so ten-
dered escheated to the state;425
6. A statute that forbade suit until the creditor applied in writing
to the debtor for repayment;426 
7. A gubernatorial proclamation in one state that banished all
British subjects or factors of British merchants who intended to
recover debts;427
8. Legislation and judicial rulings holding that interest tolled
during the six or seven years of the war.428
422. REPORT, supra note 357, at 17. Several sources informed the Secretary of State’s office
of Virginia’s 1787 statute that prevented British creditors from suing in Virginia courts until
Britain complied with the peace treaty. See, e.g., Letter from Phineas Bond to Lord Carmar-
then (Mar. 30, 1788), in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE YEAR 1896, at 561, 562-63 (1897).
423. REPORT, supra note 357, at 17.
424. Id. at 15. Several sources informed the Secretary of State’s office of depreciation laws.
See, e.g., George Miller, Report upon the Following Points, in Obedience to the Command of
His Grace the Duke of Leeds, His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(Jan. 28, 1790), Foreign Office 4/7, British National Archives.
425. REPORT, supra note 357, at 17. Many states also reenacted the old Parliamentary
statute that permitted attachment of colonial land in debt cases—something not allowed in
England. But British creditors avoided using these statutes for the same reason that they
could not safely assume title to land, because they were not legally aliens. Letter from George
Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 6, 1792), in 23 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379, 380
(Charles T. Cullenet et al. eds., 1990) (referring to Maryland’s reenactment of the British
attachment statute). On the Parliamentary attachment statute of 1732, see Claire Priest,
Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120
HARV. L. REV. 385, 389-90 (2006).
426. REPORT, supra note 357, at 17.
427. Id.; see Letter from John Hamilton, Cumberland Wilson, & Robert Gilmour to Evan
Nepean (Jan. 1790), Foreign Office 4/8, British National Archives.
428. Phineas Bond sent summaries of three cases in which state courts had refused to
award interest on debts due to British creditors. Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke of
Leeds, supra note 420; see also REPORT, supra note 357, at 18.
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The Board noted approvingly that the Confederation Congress
had recommended, in the spring of 1787, that the states repeal all
laws violating the Treaty of Peace.429 Some states ignored the re-
commendation or, like Virginia, complied conditionally.430 The Con-
federation’s failure to enforce good faith compliance only proved its
political weakness.
The new Constitution changed all this. “In a word,” the Board
reported,
many of the injustices and partialities, hitherto practised by the
Legislatures of particular States, have thus been condemned by
the United Voice of the People of America assembled in conven-
tion; and it is certainly reasonable now to expect that the pres-
ent Congress, which is composed of a body of men assembled
from every part of the United States, and who act upon a larger
scale, and in support of a more extensive and general interest,
will not commit the like acts of injustice, to which the Legisla-
tures of particular States were too frequently liable, in favour of
the immediate and pressing interests of the persons by whom
they were elected, and sometimes even to relieve the distresses
of the very individuals who composed these Provincial Legisla-
tures.431
The notion that the larger federal republic would filter up more
cosmopolitan representatives was a keystone of Federalist argument
and is associated particularly with James Madison and his Federal-
ist 10.432 Most domestic audiences had not fully grasped the full
429. REPORT, supra note 357, at 18-19. For Jay’s report, see supra notes 134-37 and accom-
panying text.
430. See REPORT, supra note 357, at 19-20. In Virginia, the home of thousands of debtors
who owed British creditors, the state legislature declared that it would open its courts to
British creditors only when Britain complied with the Treaty of Peace by evacuating the
western posts and returning the enslaved persons who fled under British protection at the end
of the war. In short, Virginia assumed the power to determine whether Britain had breached
and to retaliate for breach. See An Act to Repeal So Much of All and Every Act or Acts of
Assembly as Prohibits the Recovery of British Debts (Dec. 12, 1787), in 12 WILLIAM WALLER
HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 528 (1823) (suspending an earlier
act prohibiting Britons from suing in state court on condition that Britain comply with the
Treaty of Peace).
431. REPORT, supra note 357, at 59-60.
432. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 26, at 63-65 (James Madison); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 26, at 15 (John Jay).
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range of Madison’s argument in that essay.433 The Board of Trade
did not spell out Madison’s logic of interest cancellation, in which a
large republic would produce a multiplicity of interests such that no
single one could dominate. Nonetheless, it understood, first, that the
states were assaulting individual rights—rights of British subjects
guaranteed by the law of nations and the Treaty of Peace—and,
second, that in the larger legislature a more general interest—what
Madison had called the “public good,”434 defined in large part as
upholding international obligations—would triumph over local in-
terests. That is how the Board told the British cabinet to under-
stand the Constitution.
Stepping back from the document, the Board concluded that many
of its provisions “took their rise from defects which had been
perceived in the former system of Government. These Regulations
[that is, constitutional provisions] are founded on principles of
Justice; and they are certainly favourable to Commerce in gener-
al.”435 If Congress implemented all its provisions, “many of the laws
made by the Legislatures of Individual States, imposing partial
burthens on British Commerce, and British Ships ... will be ipso
facto repealed.”436
The Board identified about ten commercial provisions that mer-
ited special notice. Analyzing some in depth, it observed that Con-
gress now had the power to harmonize interstate commercial policy,
and again it might use that power to try to coerce Britain into open-
ing its markets, especially in the West Indies.437 The Board advised
that Parliament should not capitulate.438 The Caribbean slave-based
colonies were not, it argued, dependent on the United States be-
cause the remaining British colonies in North America could ade-
quately supply those islands.439 Even if they could not fill that void
entirely, the British monopoly over colonial shipping was too crucial
433. Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 615, 658 (1999). 
434. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 26, at 62 (James Madison).
435. REPORT, supra note 357, at 58.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 73-74 (observing that Congress had debated whether to discriminate against
British trade and decided against doing so, but it could change that policy at any time, and
therefore recommending that “it may be of use to bind the United States to the observance of
this rule in future”).
438. See id. at 80-81.
439. Id.
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for the empire’s health to permit its erosion in the transatlantic
trade.440
The Board also observed that under the Supremacy Clause, which
declared treaties to be the law of the land binding state judges, “it
may be expected, that British Creditors will now reap the benefit of
the 4th Article of the late Treaty of Peace.”441 They would now be
able to collect debts.442
Similarly, the Board concluded that under the provision declaring
“that no State is to pass any ex post facto law, impairing the Ob-
ligation of Contracts, all the laws, made by the Legislatures of In-
dividual States, to prevent British Merchants from recovering the
full value of their legal debts, must be considered as ipso facto
repealed.”443 This observation ran together two different restraints
on state legislation contained in Article I, Section 10: “No State shall
... pass any ... ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”444 In a revealing conflation, the Board assumed that the
ex post facto clause had civil effect.445 To be fair, so had several
Americans and Britons.446 Prohibiting the states from impairing the
obligations of contracts was not enough. Some debtors argued that
“obligation” covered only the principal of each loan; interest was
legally separate.447 To the Board’s eager eyes, however, the Ex Post
Facto Clause was not limited to criminal laws and, as a civil
440. See id.
441. Id. at 58.
442. See id. At this early date, the Board had received the optimistic reports from the
consuls and other sources but not yet about creditors’ continued frustrations in Virginia. See
Charles F. Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the Federal Circuit Court of Virginia,
1790 to 1797, 92 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 176 (1984) (detailing problems British creditors
encountered in Virginian and federal courts).
443. REPORT, supra note 357, at 58-59.
444. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
445. See REPORT, supra note 357, at 58-59.
446. See Marcus I, in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION, supra note 96, at 161, 164 (interpreting the clause as prohibiting retroactive alter-
ation of common law land tenures); Letter from John Hamilton to Lord Grenville (June 22,
1796), Foreign Office 5/5, British National Archives (describing a 40 percent depreciation law
in North Carolina as “an ex post facto law”); supra note 224; see also supra note 218.
447. See supra note 428 (describing Consul Bond’s account of three state cases in which
interest was denied); see also Report from John Jay to Congress, supra note 122, at 801-06
(advising the Confederation Congress that U.S. debtors owed interest under the treaty). As
Bond reported to London, some state courts denied interest for the period of the war. See, e.g.,
Hoare v. Allen, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 102, 104 n.* (1789) (state court denying interest followed by
reporter’s note referring to similar decisions in New York and Maryland).
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provision, was not redundant either.448 Instead, it prohibited states
from impeding the collection of interest as well as principal—nearly
twenty years of accumulated interest at 5 percent, or almost equal
to the underlying principal itself.449 In sum, the Board concluded
that the two provisions prevented any statute from altering con-
tracts, the underlying principal, the interest, or any remedy.
In addition, the Board celebrated federal control over coinage and
the provision in Article I, Section 10, forbidding states to allow
anything but sound money to be proffered in payment of debts.450
This meant that existing state laws that “oblige British Merchants
to take, in payment of their debts, any thing besides what is thus
made legal tender, must be considered also as ipso facto repealed.”451
In the Board’s eyes, this rectified yet another grievance: the state
tender laws that permitted debtors to pay creditors in state paper
rather than, as provided in such contracts explicitly or by commer-
cial custom, in specie.452
Finally, the Board highlighted federal question jurisdiction in
Article III. This grant of jurisdiction over cases arising under the
Constitution, national laws, and treaties
affords just reason to expect that these Fundamental Articles
[that is, the Constitution] will be carried into complete exe-
cution; and that in all these respects the Legislatures of the
Individual States, and the Courts of Judicature dependent on
them, will no longer have the power of resisting, under any
pretence, the supreme authority of Congress.453
Later in the report it noted that the first Congress had passed the
Judiciary Act, which, the Board believed, now provided for federal
enforcement of new customs laws and “Trial of all Suits arising
under the New Constitution, as well as under Treaties.”454 The
Board incorrectly implied that Congress had given the courts
original federal question jurisdiction; in fact the Judiciary Act
448. See REPORT, supra note 357, at 17-19.
449. Cf. Sheridan, supra note 47, at 166 n.19.
450. See REPORT, supra note 357, at 59.
451. Id.
452. See id. at 15, 59.
453. Id. at 59.
454. Id. at 67-69.
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extended only appellate jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases
arising under the Constitution, national laws, and treaties.455 In
other words, most suits alleging violations of federal law still had to
begin in state courts, with review permitted in the federal circuit
courts.456 The Board also did not notice that the Judiciary Act cre-
ated foreign diversity, or alienage, jurisdiction, which is how many
British creditors were able to bypass the state courts and sue di-
rectly in the federal circuit courts. Nor did it mention the significant
five hundred dollar jurisdictional minimum for those suits.457 The
Board’s streamlined impressions reflected the information it re-
ceived from America, perhaps framed by their own national legal
system, which did not divide jurisdiction vertically by subject mat-
ter.458 Confusions and omissions aside, the Cabinet learned that the
federal courts were open to British creditors and were supposed to
decide their cases according to the peace treaty, not state legisla-
tion.
Six months after receiving this report, the Privy Council drafted
instructions for George Hammond as minister plenipotentiary to the
United States.459 The Council instructed Hammond “to convince”
the American government that Britain had conformed to Article I
of the Treaty of Peace and was treating the United States “in all Re-
spects, particularly in commercial Matters, as Free, Sovereign and
Independent States.”460 This hardly ended controversies between the
two governments. A commercial treaty took three more years to
complete, with Chief Justice John Jay sailing to London for nego-
tiations, and when it came, it was deeply controversial in the United
States.461
455. See id. at 68-69.
456. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
457. See id. §§ 11-12; cf. REPORT, supra note 357, at 67-69.
458. See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 94, at 9-10, 223-24 (contrasting American and English
conceptions of court jurisdiction); Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine:
From Sovereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 386-87 (ex-
amining Federalist extension of original “arising under” jurisdiction to federal courts in the
short-lived 1801 Judiciary Act (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 82,
supra note 26, at 554)).
459. Instructions to His Majesty’s Minister Sent to the United States of America (Draft)
(July 4, 1791), Foreign Office 4/10, British National Archives. In a nice coincidence, the
Council sent the instructions to the Secretary of State on July 4th. Id.
460. Id.
461. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 62; see John Jay’s Treaty,
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Nonetheless, as the Board reported, British merchants were al-
ready plunging back into American trade and once again became
American merchants’ partners of choice.462 A central reason was
liberal British credit.463 Lord Sheffield had predicted in 1783 that
the United States would remain dependent on British merchants’
exceptionally liberal credit.464 He was right. The Board of Trade
noted that European traders’ “great expectations” of trading directly
with North America, a trade foreclosed when the thirteen states
were part of the British Empire, had by then been dashed.465 “They
learned by experience that this Trade was not to be carried on, with-
out trusting the Americans with their goods, and without giving
them longer credit than is usually given in the Trade carried on to
European Countries.”466 Only Britain’s transatlantic merchants
could offer the credit terms necessary for trading manufactured
goods across the Atlantic.467 The lesson might apply not only to the
new United States. Perhaps if other European colonists gained
independence from imperial monopolies, they too would turn to the
British:
All new established countries (and such are the United States)
can trade only with those nations, who are able to afford them
an extensive credit, and to incur the risque [sic] resulting
therefrom: If all the Colonies belonging to European Nations in
America and the West Indies, were to become Independent,
Great Britain would have undoubtedly the greatest share in the
Commerce carried on with them.468
1794-95, U.S. DEP’T STATE OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/
jay-treaty [https://perma.cc/2GFQ-5D48].
462. See REPORT, supra note 357, at 49 (noting the reluctance of European traders to offer
extensive credit to Americans); id. at 70-71 (“The excellence and cheapness of the manu-
factures of Great Britain, and the Credit, which British Manufacturers are able and willing
to give, will always ensure them a greater share in the Trade of Export to the United States,
than can be enjoyed by any other European Nation.”).
463. See id.
464. See HOLROYD, supra note 104, at 41.
465. REPORT, supra note 357, at 49.
466. Id. The unusually liberal credit arrangements between British and American mer-
chants suggested to the Board that the government should not impose aggressive trade re-
strictions against the United States. See id. at 78.
467. See id. at 49, 70-71.
468. Id. at 71.
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The Board did not develop this insight. But it is early evidence that
even mercantilist thinkers like Lord Hawkesbury saw the attraction
of “the imperialism of free trade” and why many Britons supported
the Latin American revolutions over the next generation.469
Dependence cut both ways. The Board also accepted the mer-
chants’ warning that a tariff war might damage their comparative
advantage in financing American trade.470 The Lords of Trade there-
fore recommended that Parliament avoid discriminating against
American trade, no matter what Congress did, and also continue
offering curious holdover benefits from the colonial period that
Americans still enjoyed, such as exemption from the Alien Duty.471
These early cracks in the Navigation Acts demonstrated the
influence that transatlantic merchants had in Whitehall. They also
reveal that Britons traveled with Americans along the path from
early modern empire to nineteenth-century international relations,
and together they constructed the legal infrastructure of a devel-
oping nation.
IV. THE FIRST DEVELOPING NATION?472
As diplomatic relations normalized between Britain and the
United States, British investors also began buying American se-
curities and land in large amounts.473 Transatlantic capital flows to
North America were not new, of course.474 But for two centuries they
469. The classic discussion is in Gallagher & Robinson, supra note 67. 
470. REPORT, supra note 357, at 88.
471. Id. at 94-95.
472. Cf. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION 239-47, 307-12 (1963) (sug-
gesting that political stability depends more on political culture than government structure);
RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE EMERGING NATIONS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 181, 193-95
(1970) (suggesting the influence of American democratic ideals in the decolonizing empires
of the twentieth century).
473. In 1803, foreign investors owned 56 percent of the domestic debt, over half of it in
British hands. WILKINS, supra note 15, at 35-36, 36 tbl.2.2. Alexander Hamilton was the
lawyer for the agent of the English Pulteney family, which purchased over a million acres in
central New York in the 1790s. See generally 3 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
supra note 384, at 758-812. In a related investment, shortly after the opening of the Erie
Canal, the British owned more than half of the state bonds floated to finance it. See generally
NATHAN MILLER, THE ENTERPRISE OF A FREE PEOPLE: ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN NEW YORK STATE DURING THE CANAL PERIOD, 1792-1838, at 99-111, 261-63 (1962).
474. See, e.g., WILKINS, supra note 15, at 3-27 (exploring colonial investment in North
America by British trading corporations and merchant houses).
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had represented imperial investment.475 Now it was international.476
Capital flowed into public securities, the national bank, private
corporations, mercantile accounts, and land.477 The degree of inter-
national investment in the early United States was unprecedented
in the European world, and led to a welter of legal questions about
commerce, in war and peace, on a scale that no legal community had
before encountered, generating tremendous legal creativity.478
Many factors affected European investors’ assessment of the risks
and rewards of American investment in the decade after ratifica-
tion. Not least was the spread of French revolutionary wars across
the European continent beginning in 1793, which made diversifica-
tion abroad an attractive strategy.479 But by then investors had
already bet on the safety of American assets, and they referred to
the Constitution and the institutions built upon it to justify their
confidence.480 The limited information presently available on Amer-
ican securities prices suggests that prices rose at key moments in
the process of federal state-building.481 In the first few years, and
475. See id.
476. See id. at 28-48.
477. Id.; see also RILEY, supra note 11, at 185-94 (documenting Dutch investment in U.S.
public securities and suggesting that investors possibly overreacted to the Constitution); 1
VAN WINTER, supra note 73. For specific examples, see PETER E. AUSTIN, BARING BROTHERS
AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN FINANCE (Routledge 2016) (2007); HELEN I. COWAN, CHARLES WIL-
LIAMSON: GENESEE PROMOTER—FRIEND OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 15-57 (1941);
PAUL DEMUND EVANS, THE HOLLAND LAND COMPANY 3-35 (1924); and FRANÇOIS FURSTEN-
BERG, WHEN THE UNITED STATES SPOKE FRENCH: FIVE REFUGEES WHO SHAPED A NATION
(2014).
478. For some of that creativity, see generally the classic MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). I disagree with the nascent consensus
that the early United States became something like an economic tributary of Great Britain.
At least, that is not how many early Americans saw the process. Cf. ONUF & ONUF, supra note
67, at 187-88; SEXTON, supra note 67, at 2-3. 
479. European (largely British) imports increased rapidly during 1789-1793, before the
outbreak of the French wars. Sylla, supra note 391, at 73.
480. See, e.g., 1 VAN WINTER, supra note 73, at 239 (“Some information on the changes in
government structure being considered in America reached Amsterdam during 1787, and
produced a marked increase in the interest of Dutch investors in American domestic debt.”).
481. This tentative observation is based on the author’s examination of bond price quo-
tations in early American and British newspapers between 1787 and 1800. See, e.g., THE
TIMES (London) (Sept. 22, 1789) (letter to the editor claiming that “the inhabitants of the
United States, by adopting their New Constitution, have formaly [sic] and solemnly pledged
themselves for the payment of their public debt” and possessed much public land to pay down
that debt); THE TIMES (London) (Oct. 15, 1790) (reporting that “Congress have determined to
apply one million Dollars, the revenue product of last year, to the reduction of the public
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before the European wars, these moments included the publication
of the Constitution in the fall of 1787; the inception of the federal
government in 1789; and the establishment of Hamilton’s financial
institutions in the early 1790s. In addition, qualitative evidence
indicates that the text circulated abroad as a prospectus for the
commercial environment of the new Republic.482 Even more im-
portant were the institutions built upon the spare text. These in-
stitutions, such as a funded debt, a nationally incorporated bank
whose notes could be redeemed at taxes, and federal assumption of
the states’ revolutionary debt, had been in Hamilton’s mind for
years.483 His legendary energy, backed by George Washington’s es-
sential support, turned American debt into internationally credible
commitments.484 “States, like individuals, who observe their engage-
ments, are respected and trusted,” Hamilton wrote in his first report
on public credit in January 1790.485 Already by that point, “intelli-
gence from abroad announces” that prices were rising, just as they
were on the domestic market.486 He noted that Europeans, “particu-
larly ... the Dutch,” had grasped the economic potential of the new
republic: “Our situation exposes us less, than that of any other
nation, to those casualties, which are the chief causes of expence”:
namely, war.487 In addition, the United States had unparalleled
supplies of land and natural resources.488 These raw materials of
development functioned as indirect collateral for the capital that
would fuel American growth.489 Consequently, he predicted that “no
debt—In consequence of which the American funds have had a considerable rise”). For the
history of interest rates in the United States beginning in the nineteenth century, see SIDNEY
HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 270-93 (4th ed. 2005).
482. 1 VAN WINTER, supra note 73, at 239.
483. Hamilton sketched the outlines of funding and a national bank, for example, in his
Continentalist essays, written in 1781-1782. Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. I
(July 12, 1781), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 282, at 649,
649-52; Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. IV (Aug. 30, 1781), reprinted in 2 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 282, at 669, 669-74.
484. See MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN THE CRADLE: WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN
STATE, 1783-1867, at 37 (2014); FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 289-91; MCCRAW, supra note 178,
at 97-109; ROBERT E. WRIGHT, HAMILTON UNBOUND: FINANCE AND THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 195-98 (2002).
485. THE REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON at 3 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1964).
486. Id. at 4.
487. Id. at 23.
488. See id. at 26.
489. See id.
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country will be able to borrow of foreigners upon better terms, than
the United States, because none can, perhaps, afford so good se-
curity.”490 Hamilton’s reports showed that information about Amer-
ican governance would continue to flow transatlantically in both
public and private communications. The familiar story of Hamilton’s
financial program was also an episode of creative constitution-
making—and an international event. His public offering of America
extended across the Atlantic.
As capital continued to flow, so too did legal creativity. States-
men, lawyers, and judges built upon transatlantic conversations of
the 1780s and early 1790s and continued to construct their Consti-
tution with a focus on maintaining foreign faith, all with the aim of
stoking national economic development. The spare text of the Con-
tract Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Treaty Clause all un-
derwent precedent-making construction in the first few decades
after ratification. Almost all of the hallmark doctrines of constitu-
tionally “vested rights,” for example, bore directly on international
investment. Most of the leading cases of the early years of the Su-
preme Court—such as Georgia v. Brailsford,491 Glass v. The Sloop
Betsey,492 Ware v. Hylton,493 and even Chisholm v. Georgia494—in-
volved foreign affairs.495 In addition, several of the defining Mar-
shall Court cases usually associated with internal nation-building,
such as Fletcher v. Peck496 and McCulloch v. Maryland,497 also
490. Id. at 23.
491. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) (construing state statute as sequestering rather than
confiscating British debts).
492. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (holding that “every [federal] District Court in the United
States, possesses all the powers of a court of Admiralty”).
493. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (holding that the peace treaty revived private debt despite
payment of debt to Virginia under the state’s wartime sequestration statute).
494. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that federal court has jurisdiction over suits
brought by creditor against state).
495. Kevin Arlyck, The Courts and Foreign Affairs at the Founding, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1
(analyzing the overwhelmingly “foreign” docket of the lower federal courts in the 1790s); Ariel
N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical
Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 872 (2005) (finding that one-fourth
of the early Court’s docket involved international disputes).
496. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding that state land patents were contracts for pur-
poses of the Contract Clause). Fletcher protected land grants, as contracts, held by what were
not just interstate but often multinational land partnerships and companies.
497. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). McCulloch upheld the national bank, in which for-
eigners invested as Hamilton had hoped, and it also facilitated payments by the United States
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implicated foreign interests. The complicated intersection of law and
commerce in such cases meant that American lawyers and judges
played central roles in constructing not only the Federal Constitu-
tion, but also the emerging liberal legal infrastructure of interna-
tional trade and investment.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the Federal Constitution was con-
structed in part to appeal to foreigners who did or might conduct
commerce—trade and/or capital investment—in the United States.
Seen from abroad, it guaranteed hard money, pledged public faith
to uphold preexisting debt, protected private contracts from state
interference, and prohibited uncompensated confiscation.498 It made
treaties the supreme law of the land, enforceable in courts, and
included special legal protections for aliens.499 Many of these pro-
visions were innovative and soon became standard constitutional
features of economic liberalism, which creditors began to demand
from developing nations in the nineteenth century.500 In the United
States, they were not imposed. Neither were they simply authentic
expressions of American commercial character. They represented
instead attempts to institutionalize a certain set of sociable and
commercial ideals of the Enlightenment in the newly postcolonial
United States. In turn, the resulting governmental structures
helped lay out the constitutional infrastructure of a developing na-
tion. Here, as elsewhere, key features of the Constitution and its
law developed out of an international dialogue about what was nec-
essary to make the revolutionary experiment succeed on its own
terms: to create a government based on the people that could “keep
good faith with the rest of the World,” as George Washington had
Treasury, whose bonds bulked even larger in foreign portfolios. See supra notes 473-80 and
accompanying text.
498. See generally REPORT, supra note 357.
499. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
500. CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH
AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 3-33 (1985); Christopher A. Casey, Abroad: Law, Migration, and
Capitalism in an Age of Globalization 48-58 (Summer 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author).
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hoped in 1785, and become “one of the most respectable Nations
upon Earth.”501
501. Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 298, 299 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1994).
